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THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION AND
THE ECONOMIC ADULTERATION OF FOODS
WESLEY
PART

I:

E. FORTEt

THE HISTORY OF OUR ECONOMIC ADULTERATION LAW

The economic adulteration of foods is an ancient cheat and scholars
have found references to it in the laws of Moses and the early literature
of China, Greece and Rome.1 The reported economic adulterations
of foods increased unmistakably in the 1800's and early 1900's' and it
was in this period of public indignation resulting from reports of milk
diluted with water, coffee diluted with chicory and other roasted
vegetable products, maple syrup diluted with cane sugar or glucose,
and spices diluted with ground wheat and corn that Congress first
passed prophylactic legislation preventing the debasement of foods.3
This legislation was part of the 1906 Food and Drugs Act.4 The
provisions of the 1906 Act dealing with economic adulteration were
t

Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1. See Hart, A History of the Adulteration of Food Before 1906, 7 FOOD DRUG
Cosm. L.J. 5 (1952) ; see also Kleinfeld, Legislative History of the Federal Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act, 1 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.Q. 532 n.1 (1946); Kushen, The
Significance of Section 402 (b), 10 FooD DRUG Cosu. L.J. 829 (1955).
2. The increase was probably due to both the industrialization and urbanization
of the Western World (with the greater impersonality of commercial relations) and
the development of analytical chemistry (which made it possible to discover debased
foods). See ANDERSON, THE HEALTH OF A NATION 69 (1958); Hart, supra note 1,
at 13-22; see also Anderson, Pioneer Statute: The Pure Food and Drugs Act of r9o6,
13 J. PUB. L. 189 (1964).
3. See Ibid.; Hart, Food Adulteration in the Early Twentieth Century, 7 FooD
DRUG Cosm. L.J. 485 (1952). The statute which preceded the 1906 Food and Drugs
Act was concerned only with the importation of adulterated food, drugs or liquor. See
ch. 839, § 2, 26 Stat. 415 (1890). Both before and after passage of the 1906 Act and
its superseding statute, the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act of 1938, Congress
passed legislation to prevent the sale of specific adulterated foods within federal
jurisdiction. Some of these laws prohibited the sale of specific adulterated foods, see
e.g., Tea Importation Act, 29 Stat. 604 (1897), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 41-50 (1958) ;
Filled Milk Act, 42 Stat. 1486 (1923), 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-64 (1958) ; Meat Inspection Act,
34 Stat. 1260 (1907), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 71-91 (1958) ; Butter Standard Act, 42
Stat. 1500 (1923), 21 U.S.C. § 321 (a) (1958) ; Import Milk Act, 44 Stat. 1101 (1927),
as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 141-49 (1958), while other laws imposed taxes upon the sale
of such foods or similar foods. See e.g., Oleomargarine Tax Act, INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 4591-97; Adulterated and Process or Renovated Butter Act, INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, §§ 4811-26; Filled Cheese Act, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4831-46. However,
the 1906 Food and Drugs Act was the first legislation banning adulterated foods in
general from interstate commerce and its superseding statute, the Federal Food, Drug,
& Cosmetic Act of 1938 (which contains adulteration provisions similar to the 1906
Act), is still our basic adulteration law.
4. Federal Food & Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 7, 34 Stat. 768, repealed, 52
Stat. 1059 (1938).
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strengthened in the superseding statute, the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938.' Section 402 (b) of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act covers economic adulteration and this section provides that a food is adulterated:
(b) (1) If any valuable constituent has been in whole or in
part omitted or abstracted therefrom; or (2) if any substance
has been substituted wholly or in part therefor; or (3) if
damage or inferiority has been concealed in any manner; or
(4) if any substance has been added thereto or mixed or
packed therewith so as to increase its bulk or weight, or reduce
its quality or strength, or make it appear better or of greater
value than it is.'
Additionally, section 402 (d) of the act bars economic adulteration
The Food
through the use of nonnutritive substances in confectionery
and Drug Administration, acting under the supervision of the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare, has the responsibility of enforcing
the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibiting economic adulteration.'
In 1914, Congress empowered the Federal Trade Commission to
stop "unfair methods of competition in commerce." 9 These provisions
were also strengthened in 1938 when Congress in the Wheeler Lea
Act gave the Federal Trade Commission the additional power to stop
5. Section 402 (b) of the Federal Food, Drug, & Co.metic Act, 52 Stat. 1046
(1938), 21 U.S.C. § 342(b) (1958), enacted the economic adulteration provisions of the 1906 Act in slightly broader language and abolished certain provisos in
the 1906 Act which had been used as defenses by the manufaci.urers of fabricated foods.
See text accompanying notes 48-52 infra.
6. See statute cited note 5 supra.
7. 52 Stat. 1046 (1938) as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 342 (d) (1958), provides generally
that confectionary is adulterated if it contains any nonnutritiv.! substance except flavoring, coloring, and other minor ingredients. This section supersedes a section of the
1906 Act which classified confectionary containing talc and other such substances as
adulterated. See Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, § 7, 34 Stit. 768, repealed, 52 Stat.
the Federal Food, Drug,
1059 (1938). The candy industry has objected to § 402(d) o,:"
& Cosmetic Act of 1938 and its predecessor statute as unnec,,ssary in view of the provisions in these acts which prohibit economic adulteration o. foods in general. A bill
to repeal § 402(d) has twice passed the House of Represenatives but has never been
acted upon by the Senate. See ANNUAL REPORT OF NArO.-AL CoNFEcTioN-RS AssocIATION 5 (1964-1965). The most current versions of the bill wre H.R. 7042, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965) and S. 1839, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) ard the bill died after being
favorably reported to the Senate Labor and Public Welfar, Committee by a special
subcommittee.
S. The administration of the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act of 1938 was
originally the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture until its transfer first
to the Federal Security Administrator and finally to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. See 1 CCH FOOD, DRUG, & CosmETIc L. REP. 4108.
9. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (1964).
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"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."'" Economic adulteration of foods is an "unfair method of competition" and an "unfair
or deceptive act or practice" and therefore the FDA and the FTC have
concurrent jurisdiction over this practice. 1 ' However, with a few
notable exceptions which have been largely of historical interest, 2 the
FTC has deferred to the FDA in the handling of this matter and economic adulteration is therefore regarded as an FDA problem. 3 Violations of the economic adulteration sections of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act can result in either criminal penalties' 4 or seizure of
10. 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6)(1964).
11. FDA's jurisdiction isbased on § 402(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, &
Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 342(b) (1958). "Economic adulteration"
isfood and drug law terminology. The FTC does not purport to handle economic
adulteration cases, or even to have jurisdiction over this practice as such. However,
under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (a)(6)(1964), the FTC has the power to prevent "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts and practices," and, under that authority, the
FTC has acted to prevent the sale of debased foods which deceive the public and divert
trade from honest competitors. See Fresh Grown Preserve Corp. v.FTC,125 F.2d 917
(2d Cir. 1942), inwhich the FTC alleged that itwas unfair competition to label as
"preserves" a food not containing at least 45% fruit; see also FTC v.Morrissey, 47
F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1931); FTC v. Good-Grape Co., 45 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1930)
("Good-Grape" soft drink with no natural grape flavor); cf. FTC v. American
Snuff Co., 38 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1930); Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC 281
Fed. 744 (2d Cir. 1922), inwhich the FTC alleged that respondents' packages were
associated with products composed of certain ingredients and that itwas deceptive for
respondents to use the same style packages after basic changes had been made inthe
composition of these products. Some of the FTC's cases are virtually indistinguishable
from the economic adulteration cases brought by the FDA and predecessor agencies.
Compare, e.g., FTC v.Morrissey supra, and FTC v. Good-Grape Co., supra, with
United States v.88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951) and United States v.24y Gallons of Smack, (E.D. Wis.
1926), a 1906 Act case reported unofficially inWhite & Gates, Decisions of Courts in
Cases under the Federal Food and Drugs Act 1181 (1934) (hereinafter cited as White
& Gates). Some of the FTC's trade practice rules also help to prevent economic adulteration of foods. See, e.g.,
Preserve Manufacturing Industry Rules, 16 C.F.R. 114.1
(1960) ;"Tomato Paste Manufacturing Industry Rules, 16 C.F.R. 133.1-.3 (1960);
Tuna Industry Rules, 16 C.F.R. 146.1-.2 (1960).
12. See FTC cases cited note 11 supra.
13. The FTC and the FDA have a Working Agreement defining their areas
of primary responsibility. The Working Agreement isset forth at 3 TRADE RnE. REP.
1 9850 (1954), and itprovides that, unless the agencies otherwise agree, the FTC will
exercise sole jurisdiction over alladvertising of foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetics
and the FDA will exercise sole jurisdiction over all labeling of these products. FTC's
cases against the debasement of foods have been on the theory that this appearance
(especially their labeling) has permitted them to be "passed off" on the unsuspecting
public as foods of more expensive composition. Accordingly, the FTC probably regards
economic adulteration of foods primarily as a deceptive labeling problem and, inthe
Working Agreement, the FTC ceded the responsibility of regulating the deceptive labeling of foods to the FDA.
14. Violation of the economic adulteration sections of the Federal Food, Drug,
& Cosmetic Act can result inimprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of
not more than $1,000 or both for the first offense, 52 Stat. 1043 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §
333(a) (1958), and imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine of not more
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the offending food" but the statutory provisions in the act are general,
vague, complex, and abstruse. There are no regulations clarifying the
economic adulteration sections of the act and the courts have been
understandably reluctant to impose criminal sanctions on individuals
who cannot determine in advance whether their conduct may later be
held illegal.16 The patent need for either a better understanding of
our present statute or a revised improved statute makes a review of
the prohibitions against economic adulteration both timely and appropriate.
Economic adulteration is of a different gender than most other
adulterations of food. Other adulterated foods are generally poisonous,
deleterious, filthy, decomposed, or contaminated."7 Foods which are
than $10,000 or both, if the violation was committed with intnt to defraud or mislead
or if the offender had a previous conviction, 21 U.S.C. § 333(b) (1958).
Criminal penalties may be imposed under the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic
Act even if the defendant has committed no wrongful act and lacks any knowledge of
wrong-doing. All that is required is that the defendant stand in a reasonable relationship to the wrong. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United
States v. Parfait Powder Puff Co., Inc., 163 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 851 (1948).
15. The Government can proceed against adulterated or misbranded foods having
the requisite connection with interstate commerce by libel and such foods may be
condemned and destroyed or required to be 'brought into compliance with the act. 52
Stat. 1044 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1958). The seizure remedy is more
severe in adulteration cases than in misbranding cases for two reasons. First and
most important, the Government can make multiple seizure, of allegedly adulterated
food immediately without court action whereas multiple scizures of allegedly misbranded food are not usually permitted until after the Government has secured an
initial judgment that the foods are misbranded. Second, if tha Government succeeds in
a condemnation action against misbranded food, the claimant generally can recover the
seized goods and revise the labeling or otherwise bring the foods into compliance with
the act. However, if the Government succeeds in a condemnation action against adulterated food, the same opportunity will probably not exist. Because labeling will not
usually cure an aduleration, adulterated foods must gencrally be reprocessed or
destroyed if the Government is successful. See United States v 716 Cases of Del Comida
Brand Tomatoes, 179 F.2d 174 (10th Cir. 1950), holding that watered tomatoes cannot
be released for truthful labeling. There is one possible excuption. Some foods which
are economically adulterated may comply with the law if they are re-labelled as "imitations." Compare United States v. 30 Cases of Leader Brand Strawberry Fruit Spread,
93 F.Supp. 764 (S.D. Iowa 1950) with 62 Cases of Jam v United States, 340 U.S.
593 (1951).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Fabro, Inc., 206 F. Sup,?. 523 (M.D. Ga. 1962);
see also Van Liew v. United States, 321 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1963).
17. Adulterated foods are generally those which are cither deleterious or have
been manufactured with potentially deleterious ingredients or under potentially dangerous conditions. This includes foods containing added poisonous substances, unsafe food
additives, color additives, or pesticide chemicals, filthy, putrid, or decomposed substances, as well as foods which are packed under unsanitt.ry conditions or are the
products of diseased animals. See 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), as aumended, 21 U.S.C. § 342
(1958). Some adulterated foods may be fit for human consumption, e.g., foods bearing
unsafe additives or packed under unsanitary conditions or foods containing some decomposed material, see Salamonie Packing Co. v. United States, 165 F.2d 205 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 863 (1948) ; United States v. 935 Cases of Tomato Puree, 65
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economically adulterated have none of these "dangerous" characteristics.
On the contrary, economically adulterated foods may be and frequently
are healthful and nutritious. The problem is primarily one of economic
cheat with only incidental dangers to health."8
Economic adulteration is the sole economic cheat classified as an
adulteration under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The other
economic cheats are classified as misbrandings,"9 which may result in
less serious consequences. The primary difference under the present
statute is that the Food and Drug Administration can make multiple
seizures of adulterated food immediately whereas multiple seizures of
F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1946), but such foods are, in general, potentially deleterious.
The classification of such foods as adulterated (whether or not they are individually
harmful) probably raises the general standards of safety in the food industry.
Economically adulterated foods generally have neither the deleterious characteristics
nor the deleterious potentialities of the other adulterated foods. Perhaps the adulteration
offense most similar to economic adulteration is found in § 402(a) (3). Section 402(a) (3)
classifies as adulterated those foods which are "otherwise unfit for food" and this has
been interpreted as including foods which people would not eat as well as foods which
they could not eat. See United States v. 24 Cases of Herring Roe, 87 F. Supp. 826
(D. Me. 1949) (herring roe having a tough, rubbery consistency); cf. United States
v. 298 Cases of Asparagus, 88 F. Supp. 450 (D. Ore. 1949) (asparagus allegedly too
woody and fibrous). If this liberal interpretation prevails, § 402 (a) (3) cases may
raise the same problem as the economic adulteration cases; the problem of determining
when the food varies so far from the norm that the public is defrauded. Cf. Steffy,
Otherwise Unfit For Food - A New Concept in Food Adulteration, 4 Foon DRUG
Cosi. L.J. 552, 560-62 (1949) in which the author takes the position that articles
otherwise unfit for food are those which offend aesthetic tastes, citing uncontested
FDA seizures of foods having abnormal and offensive odors, colors, and flavors.
18. See, e.g., United States v. 5 Cases of Figlia Mia Brand Vegetable Oils, 179
F.2d 519 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950) (involving diluted salad oils);
United States v. 716 Cases of Del Comida Brand Tomatoes, 179 F.2d 174 (10th Cir.
1950) (involving diluted canned tomatoes) ; United States v. 30 Cases of Leader Brand
Strawberry Fruit Spread, 93 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Iowa 1950) (involving diluted jam) ;
United States v. 254 Cases of Baby Brand Tomato Sauce, 63 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. Ark.
1945) (involving diluted tomato sauce). All of the foods involved in these cases were
healthful and nutritious although not as healthful and nutritious as the superior foods
they simulated. Cf. Van Liew v. United States, 321 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1963) in which
the Government conceded that defendant's orange drink was just as good and just
as palatable and had just as many vitamins as freshly squeezed orange juice. However,
the confusion caused by economic adulteration may result in dangers to health in some
situations. Cf. The 1950 Annual Report of the Food and Drug Administration, Kleinfeld & Dunn, Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 1953-57 at 564, 569 (1957). [The
five volumes under this title for 1938-49, 1949-50, 1951-52, 1953-57, and 1958-60 are
hereinafter cited as 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 Kleinfeld, respectively. The first four volumes of
the book were written Kleinfeld and Dunn and the fifth volume was written by Kleinfeld and Kaplan.] in which the FDA suggested that many mothers were being deceived
into serving orangeade instead of orange juice, thus impairing the health of small
children.
19. These offenses generally are false or misleading labeling, sale under the
name of another food, sale of an imitation food not prominently marked as such,
deceptive packaging, failure to state certain mandatory information prominently on
the label, and failure to conform to the standards of identity, quality, or fill of container.
See 52 Stat. 1047 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1958).
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misbranded food are not permitted (except under special circumstances)
until the Government has secured a judgment that the food is misbranded.2" This classification of economic adulteration as a more
serious offense than the other economic cheats does not have any discerable basis in logic. 2 Economically adulterated foods are generally
foods of inferior composition which may be coniused with foods of
superior composition and economic adulteration is prohibited because
of the possibility that the inferior food may be passed off for the
superior food at some point in the distribution system. 22 The offense
is therefore similar to the offering of a food for sale under another
name, or the selling of an imitation food withottt labeling it "imitation," or the selling of a standardized food which does not meet governmental standards. Yet all of these other "passing-off" type offenses are classified as misbrandings rather than adulterations.23 The
more drastic classification of economic adulteration probably reflects the
public indignation aroused by reports of economic adulteration at the
time the 1906 Act was passed as well as the revulsion most of us still
feel at the thought of any tampering with the composition of our foods.
The 1906 Food and Drugs Act provided that a food is adulterated:
First. If any substance has been mixed and packed with
it so as to reduce or lower or injuriously affect its quality or
strength.
Second. If any substance has been substituted wholly or in part
for the article.
20. Generally, the FDA can only make one seizure of a misbranded food until
it has secured a judgment in its favor. See 52 Stat. 1044 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)
(1958). However, if the Secretary has probable cause to bflieve that the misbranded
article is dangerous to health, or that its labeling is frauduknt or that it would be in
a material respect misleading to the injury or damage of tfe purchaser or consumer,
multiple seizures may be made immediately. See Ibid.
The claimant has no right to a hearing on the facts whicb are the basis for seizures
and the Secretary's findings of facts are not subject to judicial review even if they are
arbitrary and capricious. See Ewing v. Mytinger and Casselbcrry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
21. If logic were the test, the offenses could appropriately have been divided into
more or less serious categories, depending upon whether the offense resulted in a
danger to health or merely an economic violation. Alternatively, the offenses could also
have been appropriately divided into more or less serious categories depending on
whether the offense related to the composition of the food itself or merely to its label
or container or the information printed thereon. The classification of offenses in the
present statute is not supported by either rationale.
22. Foods may be economically adulterated although there is no immediate danger
of passing-off. Truthful labeling is, in general, therefore no defense to an economic
adulteration charge. See United States v. 36 Drums of Pop'N Oil, 164 F.2d 250 (5th
Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Two Bags of Poppy Seeds, 147 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1945).
23. See 52 Stat. 1047 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1958).
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Third. If any valuable constituent of the article has been wholly
or in part abstracted.
Fourth. If it be mixed, colored, powdered, coated, or stained
in a manner whereby damage or inferiority is concealed.24
The generality of language in this definition of adulteration was such
that, standing alone and interpreted literally, it could have seriously
impeded improvements in the composition of fabricated foods.2" This
result was avoided under the 1906 Act by two provisos. The provisos
stated that a food which contained no added poisonous or deleterious
ingredients was not adulterated if it was either (i) a mixture or compound sold under its own distinctive name, or (ii) a compound, imitation, or blend plainly labeled as such. 6 All fabricated foods could therefore be excluded from the economic adulteration prohibitions of the
1906 Act simply by labeling the foods in conformity with the provisos.2 7
The provisos thus provided the honest manufacturer with the opportunity
to continue the development and sale of new and improved foods and
the dishonest manufacturer with the opportunity to palm off inferior
foods on the public under more or less distinctive names.
Upon the passage of the 1906 Act, the Government began a vigorous
attack upon economic adulteration in both criminal and civil cases. Convictions were secured in numerous criminal28 and civil29 cases. Inter24. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, § 7, 34 Stat. 768, repealed, 52 Stat. 1059
(1938).
25. The broadest and most restrictive section of the 1906 Act prohibited substituting any substance in whole or in part for the food. Since most improvements in
fabricated foods are made by substituting one ingredient for another, this provision
(without the provisos) could have imposed serious limitations on the food industry.
Other provisions could have raised similar if less serious problems. The section of the
1906 Act prohibiting abstracting of valuable constituents of foods could have prevented
the development of dietary foods. The section of the 1906 Act prohibiting coloring a
food to conceal inferiority could have impeded the expanding use of artificial colorings.
(Consider, for example, whether artificial coloring in oleomargarine or orange soda
merely makes those foods more visually attractive or conceals their inferiority.) However, the most serious problems were those raised 'by the prohibition against substitution of ingredients under the 1906 Act, and this problem was solved by the provisos
which provided fabricated foods were not adulterated if they were sold under distinctive
names or as compounds, imitations or blends.
26. See statute cited note 24 supra, at § 8.
27. Fabricated foods are foods which are made by combining two or more ingredients. Cf. 52 Stat. 1047 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 343 (i) (2) (1958).
28. See, e.g., Union Dairy Co. v. United States, 250 Fed. 231 (7th Cir. 1918) (milk
diluted by water) ; Frank v. United States, 192 Fed. 864 (6th Cir. 1911) (pepper
diluted by corn; United States v. Frank, 189 Fed. 195 (S.D. Ohio 1911) (lemon extract
diluted by alcohol and water); United States v. South Hero Creamery Ass'n, White
& Gates 1142 (D. Vt. 1925) (butter with less than 80 per cent milk-fat); United
States v. Atlantic Macaroni Co., White & Gates 793 (E.D.N.Y. 1917) (macaroni dyed
yellow to conceal inferiority) ; United States v. German American Specialty Co., White
& Gates 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (eggs diluted by skim milk); United States v. Libby,
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spersed among the Government's many victories in economic adulteration
cases were a considerable number of defeats. Some of these defeats
resulted from problems inherent in all litigation (e.g., faulty pleadings"0
and adverse findings of fact) 1 but other defeats resulted from problems
which were unique to economic adulteration law. These problems included difficulties in proving the standard against which the allegedly
spersed among the Government's many victories in economic adulteration
.fcNeill & Libby, White & Gates 442 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 210 Fed. 148 (4th Cir. 1913)
(condensed skimmed milk diluted by sugar).
29. See, e.g., United States v. 60 Barrels of Wine, 225 Fed. 846 (W.D. Mo. 1915)
(claret wine diluted by pomace wine); William Henning & Co., v. United States, 193
Fed. 52 (5th Cir. 1912) (catsup diluted by pumpkin) ; United States v. 100 Barrels of
Vinegar, 188 Fed. 471 (D. Minn. 1911) (cider vinegar dilutd by distilled vinegar);
United States v. 420 Sacks of Flour, 180 Fed. 518 (E.D. La. 1910) (flour bleached to
conceal inferiority), But see, Lexington Mill & Elevator Co. -. United States, 202 Fed.
615 (8th Cir. 1913), aff'd, 232 U.S. 399 (1914).
30. The generality of the statute invited vague pleadings but the courts insisted
that the defendant be informed with sufficent particularity or certainty of the charge
against him to enable him to prepare his defense. See, e.g., United States v. Krumm,
269 Fed. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1921); United States v. St. Louis Coffee & Spice Mills, 189
Fed. 191 (E.D. Mo. 1909); United States v. 154 Cases of Tomatoes, White & Gates
967 (W.D. Pa. 1920).
31. See United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399 (1914)
(affirming a court of appeals' decision which reversed a vercict because there was no
substantial evidence that the bleaching of flour concealed inferiority) ; Hall-Baker Grain
Co. v. United States, 198 Fed. 614 (8th Cir. 1912) (holding tat there was no evidence
to support a verdict that No. 2 wheat had been adulterated by inferior wheat) ; United
States v. 3998 Cases of Canned Tomatoes, White & Gates 1213 (D. Del. 1928) (jury
failed to find that excess water had been added to canned iomatoes) ; United States
v. 200 Sacks of Wheat Middlings, White & Gates 1189 (E.D. Mich. 1926) (the court,
sitting without a jury, failed to find that the grinding of whkat middlings into powder
concealed their inferiority); United States v. 4%Cases of Creme De Menthe, White
& Gates 1191 (E.D. Mo. 1926) (jury failed to find that cafLeine had been substituted
in part for creme de menthe flavor non-alcoholic cocktail); United States v. South
Peacham Creamery Co., White & Gates 1147 (D. Vt. 1925) and United States v.
Barnet Creamery Ass'n, White & Gates 1149 (D. Vt. 1925) (juries failed to find
butter deficient in butterfat) ; United States v. 37 One Poumd Packages of Colors,
White & Gates 1165 (E.D. Pa. 1925) (jury failed to find that food colors had been
diluted by paste) ; United States v. Marmarelli, White & Ga'es 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)
(jury failed to find that defendants had diluted olive oil witla cottonseed oil); United
States v. Potter, White & Gates 409 (E.D. N.C. 1912) (jury failed to find that excess
water was used in canning oysters); United States v. Heide, White & Gates 325
(S.D.N.Y. 1911) (jury failed to find that 5% glucose reduced the quality of almond
paste) ; United States v. St. Louis Coffee & Spice Mills, 189 J ed. 191 (E.D. Mo. 1909)
(directed verdict for the defendant because there was no evilence that vanilla extract
and vanilla flavor were the same foods).
32. The Government did not have the authority to fix st indards of identity having
the effect of law under the 1906 Food and Drugs Act. See Crawford, Ten Years of
Food Standardization,3 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.Q. 243, 244-45 (1948). It was therefore
necessary to prove in each case both the composition of the adulterated food and the
ordinary or standard composition of the food alleged to be economically adulterated.
Even when regulations had been promulgated by the Deparnment of Agriculture defining the ordinary composition of foods, they were usually not given any weight. See
e.g. United States v. Swift & Co., White & Gates 1146 (D. Ore. 1925) (no standard
of butterfat for butter); United States v. St. Louis Coffee & Spice Mills, 189 Fed.

354
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provisos.
Litigation under the distinctive name proviso tended to produce
bizarre results. Manufacturers frequently adopted names which were
more descriptive than distinctive for foods of inferior composition which
were then passed off as familiar superior foods on the unsuspecting public. A classic example was a product which looked like, tasted like, and
was used for the same purpose as jam but which contained little fruit
and was labeled "Bred Spred." Economic adulteration charges against
this product were dismissed because the court held that "Bred Spred"
was a distinctive name."
In like decisions, an imitation grape juice
191 (E.D. Mo. 1909) (no standard for vanilla flavor). But see, United States v.
Frank, 189 Fed. 195 (S.D. Ohio 1911) (accepting USDA standards for lemon extract).
Difficulties in determining the standard against which the adulterated food was to be
judged confounded the courts and resulted in judgments against the Government in
some cases. See United States v. Swift & Co., supra; United States v. St. Louis
Coffee & Spice Mills, supra; and United States v. Rinchini, White & Gates 318 (D.
Ariz. 1911) (no standard of butterfat for ice cream); W. B. Wood Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 286 Fed. 84 (7th Cir. 1923) (no standard for salt in food colors);
United States v. 30 Cases of Grenadine Syrup, 199 Fed. 932 (D. Mass. 1912) (no
standard requiring pomegranate juice in grenadine syrup). See 1933 REPORT OF THE
FOOD AND DRUG AD IsNI TRATIoN p. 14, which is reprinted in DuNBAR, FEDERAL Fool),
DRUG & COsmETIc LAw, ADMINISTRATION REPORTS 1907-49, 800 (1951) However, the
Government was "fairly successful" in proving the composition of foods in judicial
proceedings although it objected to the expense and complexity of that procedure. See
1931 REPORT OF THE FOOD AND DauG ADMINISTRATION pp. 5-6, which is reprinted in
DUNBAR, supra at 742-43.

33. "Bred Spred" was the subject of three reported seizure actions, all of which
ended unhappily for the Government. In the first case (which ended in an informal
and ambiguous opinion by the district court), the judge apparently concluded that a
food which was not labeled with the distinctive name of another food was exempt
from the economic adulteration laws under the distinctive name proviso. United States
v. 4932 Cases of Bred Spred, White & Gates 1204 (E.D. Mich. 1927); see Markel,
"The Law on Imitation Food" 5 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 145, 154 (1950). The second
case was dismissed because it involved the same issues as the first Bred Spred case
and the first case therefore operated as a collateral estoppel against the Government.
United States v. 15 Cases of Bred Spred, 35 F.2d 183 (7th Cir. 1929). In the third
case, the circuit court held that there was no proof that Bred Spred was economically
adulterated because of concealed damage or inferiority. The court reasoned that the
ingredients in Bred Spred were not of low quality and that the only allegation was
that Bred Spred contained less fruit than ordinary jam. United States v. Ten Cases
of Bred Spred, 49 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1931). The comparison of Bred Spred with ordinary
jam was inappropriate, according to the court, because there was no proof that Bred
Spred was being palmed off on the public as jam. A misbranding charge grounded on
the theory that Bred Spred was an imitation jam (not labeled as such) was defeated
because the Government had, incredibly, failed to make the exhibit-jars of Bred Spred
and the exhibit-jars of jam part of the record on appeal. The Circuit Court was
therefore unable to compare Bred Spred against jam to determine the imitation issue.
The Bred Spred cases provided much of the stimulus for the strengthening of the
economic adulteration laws of the 1906 Act in the later Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act. See 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593 (1951) and United States
v. 30 Cases of Leader Brand Strawberry Fruit Spread, 93 F.Supp. 764 (S.D. Iowa 1950),
in which the courts alluded the effect of the Bred Spred case on Congress. See also
Kleinfeld, "Legislative History of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosnetic Act," 1 FOOD
DRUG Cosm. L. Q. 532, 548, 559 (1946), summarizing some of the testimony concerning
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labeled "Grape Smack" was absolved under the distinctive name proviso," ' as was a product which consisted of calcium acid phosphate and
corn starch and was labeled with the initials of its more expensive ingredient, "C.A.P."'3
One court even decided that "Macaroons" was
a distinctive name thereby exculpating the defendant-producer (and presumably all other producers of macaroons) from the federal economic
adulteration laws.36 Other decisions were more rational, holding, for
example, that "Mapleine"3 and "Maple Flavo'" were not distinctive
names for imitation maple flavors. "Grant's Hygienic Crackers" was
correctly held to be a distinctive name;" "Fruit Puddine" and "Crearm
Vanilla" were both held to be distinctive names in a more dubious decision,4 and one misguided judge submitted the question whether "Milk
Chocolate" was a distinctive name to the jury, which ultimately exonerated a defendant who was accused of adulteratirg his milk chocolate
with wheat starch. 1
Equally absurd results occurred when the courts considered the
proviso absolving from economic adulteration charges all products which
were compounds, imitations, or blends and were plainly labeled as such42
One court held that an imitation cherry juice labeled "Fruit Wild Cherry
Compound" was not adulterated because it was labeled "compound," '
Bred Spred during the hearings on the bills which later bucame the Federal Food,
Drug, & Cosmetic Act.
The irony is that the Government might have won the third Bred Spred case under
the 1906 Act thereby ending the fraud perpretrated on the public by that product, if
the Government had proved that Bred Spred was being pas~ed off as jam or made
the jars of Bred Spred and jars of jam part of the appellate record so that the court could
decide whether or not Bred Spred was an imitation.
34. United States v. 24?/s Gallons of Smack, White & Gat,'s 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1926).
35. United States v. 100 Barrels of Calcium Acid Phos)?hate, White & Gates 58
(N.D. Cal. 1909).
36. See F. B. Washburn & Co. v. United States, 224 Fed. 395 (1st Cir. 1915),
reversing a judgment of adulteration on this and other grounds, but affirining a judgment of misbranding.
37. United States v. 300 Cases of Mapleine, White & Gates 39 (N.D. Ill. 1909).
38. United States v. S. Gumpert, White & Gates 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1910).
39. United States v. Hygienic Health Food Co., White & Gates 259 (N.D. Cal.
1911).
40. "Fruit Puddine" was held to be a distinctive name for a pudding without
fruit on the theory that the name had acquired a secondary imeaning. "Cream Vanilla,"
a flavor of Fruit Puddine that contained vanillin rather than vanilla, presented more
difficult problems. The Government suggested that Cream Vanilla implied that the
pudding was flavored with the best vanilla (cream of the vanilla) but the claimant
persuaded the court that Cream Vanilla was an arbitrary d,!signation. Fruit Puddine
was, however, held to be misbranded because it was falsely labelled "Fruit Flavored."
United States v. 150 Cases of Fruit Puddine, 211 Fed. 360 (D. Mass. 1914).
41. United States v. Auerbach & Sons, White & Gates 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
42. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, § 8, 34 Stat. 768, repecled, 52 Stat. 1059 (1938).
43. Weeks v. United States, 224 Fed. 64 (2d Cir. 1915), aff'd on other grounds,
245 U.S. 618 (1918).
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while another court held that a product called "Compound Ess Grape"
was adulterated (despite the word "compound") because it consisted
only of imitation grape essence." A product labeled "Compound White
Pepper" was held economically adulterated because corn had been intermixed with the pepper, although the court indicated that if the produ6t
had been labeled "White Pepper Compound," the economic adulteration
charges would have been dismissed." There was a marked difference
of opinion concerning whether the ingredients of compounds had to
be listed on the labels of these products, 6 and, while the economic adulteration sections of the 1906 Act may have been theoretically workable, 7
44. United States v. Schider, 246 U.S. 519 (1918).
45. Frank v. United States, 192 Fed. 864 (6th Cir. 1911). The Court reasoned
that the ordinary purchaser would believe that White Pepper Compound was white
pepper plus another ingredient but that the ordinary purchaser would believe that
Compound White Pepper was white pepper with added strength.
46. There was no provision in the 1906 Food and Drugs Act expressly requiring
the labeling of ingredients of compounds. However, the Department of Agriculture's
regulations required a clear statement of the principal or essential ingredients o'f such
foods and at least one economic adulteration case supported this type of requirement
See Rules and Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food and Drugs Act
(Ninth Revision) § 20(a) (1927) reprinted at I DuNN's FoOD AND DRUG LAws 14
(1927), (hereinafter cited as DuNN); William Henning & Co. v. United States, 193
Fed. 52 (5th Cir. 1912). Contra United States v. Weeks, White & Gates 519 (S.D.N.Y.
1913), rev'd on other grounds, 224 Fed. 64 (2d Cir. 1915), aff'd, 245 U.S. 618 (1918) ;
United States v. One Carload of Corno Horse and Mule Feed, 188 Fed. 453 (M.D.
Ala. 1911); cf. United States v. Goodman, White & Gates 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1913).
47. The Government's principal problems with economic adulteration cases under
the 1906 Act were the problems of proving the standard composition of the food which
was allegedly adulterated and the problems raised by the two provisos. Proof of the
standard composition of a food is merely a question of fact and probably no more
difficult than many other questions of fact decided in connection with ordinary negligence
or patent cases. In general, the Government was not losing many cases on the "standard" problem, see note 32 supra, and it is likely that if the Government continued to
prepare its cases carefully and the appellate courts reviewed the record fairly, proof of
the standard would not have been a major problem.
The problems raised by the provisos could have been resolved through a different
interpretation of their language. The distinctive name proviso exempted mixtures or
compounds sold under their own distinctive name "and not an imitation of or offered
for sale under the distinctive name of another article." It could therefore be argued
that a food which was an imitation was not exempted by the distinctive name proviso
and, indeed, some courts so held, although others held contra. See United States v.
Five Cases of Champagne, 205 Fed. 817 (N.D.N.Y. 1913); see also Hudson Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 192 Fed. 920 (5th Cir. 1912) ; cf. United States v. 9 Cases of Sparkling
White Seal, White & Gates 1023 (E.D. Pa. 1921), aff'd, 285 Fed. 737 (3d Cir. 1923).
Contra United States v. 24?s Gallons of Smack, White & Gates 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1926).
See also Markel, The Law on Imitation Food, 5 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 145, 154-64
(1950). The Department of Agriculture regulation interpreting that proviso also stated
that foods sold under distinctive names could not be imitations of other articles. See
Rules and Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food and Drugs Act §
19(b) (1927) (reprinted in DUNN 13).
The second proviso exempted compounds, imitations, and blends, if the word "compound," "imitation," or "blend" was stated plainly on the label. The Department
of Agriculture regulations interpreting this proviso stated that an imitation food must
be labeled "imitation" and that compounds and blends must be labeled "compounds"
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in general it was impossible to predict the results of any litigation in
which one of the provisos was raised as a defcnse to an economic
adulteration charge. The conflicting decisions, their apparent absurdity,
and the certainty that the public was still being defrauded through some
of these products brought a demand for legislative reform, and it was
in this context that in 1938 the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
was enacted.
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act struck directly at the
defenses which manufacturers had raised in economic adulteration
cases. First, the new statute permitted the Government after notice and
hearing to define the composition of each food in regulations called
"standards of identity.""5 After a food was defined by the Government
in a standard of identity the producers of that food either had to comply
with the standard, or label and sell their products as imitations.49
and "blends." See Rules and Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food and
Drugs Act § 20 (1927) (reprinted at DUNN 14). Had the courts decided that many
of the products challenged by the Government were imitatiors and could only be sold
as such rather than as compounds and blends, this proviso albo would have offered no
refuge for those defrauding the public. Cf. United States v. ScVider, 246 U.S. 519 (1918).
The remaining problems under the 1906 Act would be little different from the
problems which the Government has now under the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic
Act. However, the provisos might under these revised interpretations offer desirable
counterparts to the present all inclusive language of § 402(b).
48. Under § 401 of the act, when such action will promote honesty and fair
dealing in the interest of consumers, the Secretary can fix a reasonable definition and
standard of identity for a food. See 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 341
(1958). Standards of identity have been promulgated for the following foods: Cacao
Products (chocolate, cocoa, etc.), 21 C.F.R. 14 (1955); Cereal Flours, 21 C.F.R. 15
(1955) ; Macaroni and Noodle Products, 21 C.F.R. 16 (1955): Bakery Products (Bread
& Rolls), 21 C.F.R. 17 (1955) ; Milk and Cream, 21 C.F.R. 18 (1955) ; Cheeses and Related Foods, 21 C.F.R. 19 (1959) ; Frozen Desserts (Ice Cream and Related Products),
21 C.F.R. 20 (1965); Food Flavorings (Vanilla Extract and Similar Products), 21
C.F.R. 22 (1963); Dressings for Foods (Mayonnaise, French and Salad Dressing), 21
C.F.R. 25 (1955) ; Canned Fruits and Fruit Juices, 21 C.F.R. 27 (1955) ; Fruit Butters,
Jellies, and Related Products, 21 C.F.R. 29 (1955) ; Shellfish (Shrimp and Oysters), 21
C.F.R. 36 (1955) ; Canned Tuna Fish, 21 C.F.R. 37 (1958) ; Eggs and Egg Products, 21
C.F.R. 42 (1955); Oleomargarine and Margarine, 21 C.F.R. 45 (1955); Canned Vegetables, 21 C.F.R. 51 (1955) ; and Tomato Products, 21 C.F.R. 53 (1955).
Foods which comply with standards of identity may still b,! economically adulterated.
FDA's regulations specifically provide for concurrent applicability of the general provisions of the act and the standards of identity for particular foods and one of the
examples in the regulations involves economic adulteration: "A provision in such
regulations [standards of identity] for the use of coloring or flavoring does not
authorize such use under circumstances or in a manner whereby damage or inferiority
is concealed or whereby the food is made to appear better or of greater value than
it is." 21 C.F.R. 10.1(c) (Supp. 1962). Even foods which 2re labeled "imitation" can
probably violate our economic adulteration laws, see Austern, Ordinary English But
Not Ordinary Jam, 6 Food DRUG Cosm. L.J. 909, 913 (1951), although there do not
seem to be any reported cases involving such a situation.
49. The classic United States Supreme Court case involving standards of identity
is Federal Security Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943). The Quaker Oats
Co. had manufactured and sold for ten years a cereal consisting of farina plus vitamin D.
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Second, the new statute required all non-standardized foods which were
fabricated from two or more ingredients to state each such ingredient
on the label."0 Finally, and most important, the new statute enacted the
economic adulteration provisions of the 1906 Act in slightly broader
language,51 repealing at the same time the two provisos which had exonThe Administrator (who then had the responsibility of administering the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act) promulgated standards of identity for two farina products ordinary farina with no vitamins added called "farina," and "enriched farina" with
added vitamins B, D, and other ingredients. Since the Quaker Oats product did not
comply with either of these standards, it could not be sold as either "farina" or "enriched farina." The company appealed, arguing that the standards were arbitrary and
unreasonable. However, the United States Supreme Court (6-3) upheld the standards.
In a later case, 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593 (1951), the Government
had promulgated a standard of identity for jam requiring 45% fruit in that product
while the claimant was manufacturing a product labeled "Imitation Jam" which contained only 25% fruit. The Government seized the claimant's product, asserting that
it was in violation of the standard of identity and the United States Supreme Court
(7-2) held that the product did not violate the standard of identity because it did
not purport to be "jam," it purported to be and was "imitation jam." After these two
Supreme Court cases, it was generally recognized that when standards of identity for
a food have been promulgated, the food must either conform to these standards or,
perhaps, be labelled "imitation," or it cannot be sold.
While violations of the standards of identity could be considered a form of economic adulteration, cf. Willis, Preventing Economic Adulteration of Food, 1 Foo DRUG
CosM. L.Q. 20 (1946), it would seem that the better view is contra. "Farina with
Vitamin D Added" may be barred from sale as such because it violates standards of
identity, cf. Federal Security Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., supra; see also Libby, M7%cNeill & Libby v. United States, 148 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1945) (condemning a product
labeled tomato catsup with preservative because it did not conform to the standard for
tomato catsup), but only under the most liberal definitions can such a product be
considered as adulterated or debased food. Cf. United States v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 4 Kleinfeld 138 (D.Neb. 1955). But see ANDERSON, THE HEALTH OF A NATION 69
(1958), stating that Dr. Harvey W. Wiley's view was that adulteration was any
purposeful change in the composition of a food whether or not it resulted in debasement. The real importance of standards of identity is that they avoid recourse to the
economic adulteration prohibitions in most instances involving foods for which standards have been established. Proof of noncompliance with the standard of identity
constitutes a misbranding and the FDA often secures a judgment on that basis without
trying the more complex issues of economic adulteration.
50. See 52 Stat. 1047 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 343(i) (2) (1958). The ingredients had
to be stated with sufficient prominence and conspicuousness and in such terms as would
be likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual under customary conditions of purchase and use. 52 Stat. 1047 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 343(f) (1958). FDA's
regulations prohibited the listing of ingredients in misleading order and required the
proportion of an ingredient to be disclosed when the proportion became material in the
light of representations concerning the ingredient. 21 C.F.R. § 1.10(d) (1) and (2)
(1955). The sum of these statutes and regulations gave the intelligent consumer fairly
complete information concerning the composition of the food, and this information has
probably acted as an indirect deterrent to economic adulteration.
51. Section 402(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act is broader than
the economic adulteration provisions of the 1906 Act in the following areas:
(a) Section 402(b) (1) provides a food is adulterated if a valuable constituent has
been omitted or abstracted. Omitting a valuable constituent was not included under the
1906 Act.
(b) Section 402(b) (3) provides a food is adulterated if damage or inferiority has
been concealed in any manner. The 1906 Act covered concealment of damage or in-
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erated from the economic adulteration laws all fabricated foods which
were either labelled with distinctive names or as compounds, imitations,
or blends.
The repeal of these provisos left the language of the 1906
Act in slightly broadened form standing by itself. This statute, which is
so broad that it cannot be taken literally and so ambiguous that it can
hardly be interpreted intelligently, became Section 402 (b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law and is our present law. The statute
does not define the standards used to determine economic adulterations
and this has been one of the many complex problems faced by the courts
in economic adulteration cases.
PART II:

THE STANDARDS USED TO DETERMINE

EcoNoMIc
A.

ADULTERATION

Introduction

Section 402 (b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act begins
by stating, "A food shall be deemed to be adulterated" and then defines
in individual subsections the conditions which may result in the economic
adulteration of a food." Sections 402 (b) (1) -and (2) provide that
a food is adulterated if any valuable constituent of the food is removed
or omitted, or if any substance is substituted in whole or in part therefore.' Sections 402 (b) (3) and (4) provide that a food is adulterated
if damage or inferiority is concealed in the food, or if any substance has
been packed with the food to increase its bulk or weight, reduce its
quality or strength or make it appear better or of greater value than
feriority by mixing, coloring, powdering, coating, or staining the food; and
(c) Section 402(b) (4) provides a food is adulterated ii' any substance has been
added, mixed, or packed with it to increase its bndk or weiqht, reduce its quality or
strength, or mnake it appear greater or of better value than it is. The 1906 Act covered
mLxing or packing a substance with the food to reduce or lower or injuriously affect
its quality or strength. See 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.C. 342(b) (1958) and Federal
Food & Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 7, 34 Stat. 768, repealed, 52 Stat. 1059 (1938).
Only § 402(b) (2) was not changed significantly from :he language of the 1906
Act. This section provided a food is adulterated if any substar ce has been substituted in
whole or in part for the food, and it was the broadest section in the 1906 Act.
52. The effect of repealing the provisos was dramatically illustrated in United
States v. 651 Cases of Chil-Zert, 114 F. Supp. 430 (N.D.N.Y. 1953). Claimant in that
case manufactured and sold a product which resembled ice cream but was composed of
soy fat and soy protein rather than milk fat and milk protein. The product was seized
because it was not labeled imitation ice cream and the claimant defended on the ground
that its labeling was truthful. The court granted the Government's motion for summary
judgment, stating, "The Court is impressed that claimant's argument proceeds as if
the distinctive name provision of the 1906 Act is still in force, and claimant seeks to
use the fanciful name of Chil-Zert with informative labeling to escape the provisions
of the present statute. (The distinctive name provision was eliminated in the 1938 Act)."
Id. at 433.
53. 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 342(b) (1958).
54. 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 342 (b) (1) and (2) (1958).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
it is." "Food" is defined in the act as "(1) articles used for food or
drink for man or other animals, (2) chewing gum, and (3) articles
used for components of any such article."56 This general definition is
satisfactory for most purposes but it offers little help in the interpretation of section 402 (b).
The word "food" in section 402 (b) can be given either of two
different interpretations. One interpretation is that "food" means a
familiar recognizable food; the other interpretation is that "food" means
the allegedly adulterated food itself." For example, assume a product
called "Bred Spred" is made in semblance of jam but with only one-half
the fruit content of jam.58 If the court defined "food" as the familiar
recognizable food, Bred Spred would be an economically adulterated
jam. However, if the court defined "food" as the allegedly adulterated
product, Bred Spred would be an economically adulterated food when
compared to jam. Both interpretations seem equally acceptable so long
as the only standard against which Bred Spred can be judged is that of
the familiar recognizable food, "jam."'" However, if Bred Spred may
55. 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 342 (b) (3) and (4) (1958).
56. 52 Stat. 1041 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 321 (f) (1958).
57. In United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951), the claimant argued that under § 402(b),
the court either had to conclude that the seized product was a familiar recognizable
food which was adulterated or a new and original food which was unadulterated. The
claimant reasoned that § 402(b) (4) said a food was adulterated if any substance was
"mixed or packed therewith" etc., and that the prohibition must mean that a basic and
identifiable article of food had been adulterated through the introduction of some
additive. The court rejected that argument citing prior cases in which "food" had been
interpreted as the allegedly adulterated product rather than as a familiar recognizable
food. The court concluded that § 402(b) (4) applied ".... whether a recognized food
is altered or sundry ingredients are combined or compounded to make what is essentially
a new article of manufacture." Id. at 970. There was thus a recognition in the court's
opinion that food could either mean the "familiar recognizable food" or the "allegedly
adulterated food." Cf. Kushen, The Significaiwe of Section 402(b), 10 FOOD DRUG COsiM
L.J. 829, 843 (1955).
58. "Bred Spred" is generally considered the classic example of economic adulteration although the product was exonerated in the three reported cases under the
1906 Act. See text accompanying note 33 supra. United States v. 30 Cases of Leader
Brand Strawberry Fruit Spread, 93 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Iowa 1950), involved a product
similar to Bred Spred called "Leader Brand Strawberry Fruit Spread" and the product
was held economically adulterated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
While the court's opinion is somewhat unclear, it seemed to be grounded on the theory
that the product was an adulterated jam.
59. Defining food as the familiar recognizable food is the easiest and most
grammatically precise interpretation of § 402(b). Using this interpretation, the statute
would be neither familiar nor recognizable. See 52 Stat. 1041 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 321(f)
has -been removed from the familiar recognizable food, or any substance has been substituted for the familiar recognizable food, or if damage or inferiority has been concealed in the familiar recognizable food, or any substance has been added to the familiar
recognizable food to increase its bulk or reduce its quantity or strength, or make it
appear better than it is.
Defining "food" as the allegedly adulterated food provides a less graceful inter-
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be economically adulterated by comparison with some standard other
than jam, "food" in section 402 (b) cannot be interpreted consistently
as the familiar recognizable food."0 "Food" must then mean the allegedly
adulterated product itself in at least some cases 6 and the courts can
look beyond the standard of the familiar recognizable food in these
cases in determining economic adulteration. This is the important issue
whether the ambit of consumer protection is limited to confusion with
a familiar recognizable food. The issue is completely obscured if the
standard of the familiar recognizable food is read into the statute
through the word "food."
B. The ProperInterpretationof Bireley's: Eco;tomic Adulteration
Standards Must Be Reasonably Definite and Precise
United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage62 is considered the leading economic adulteration case both on the interpretation
of the word "food" in section 402 (b) and on the standards which are
to be applied in determining whether a food is adulterated under that
section. The Bireley's case involved an orange beverage which consisted
pretation of the statute. Using this interpretation, the statute would provide that an
allegedly adulterated food is adulterated if a valuable constituent has been removed
from the allegedly adulterated food, or any substance has been substituted for the allegedly adulterated food, or if damage or inferiority has been concealed in the allegedly
adulterated food, or any substance has been added to the allegedly adulterated food to
increase its bulk, or reduce its quality or strength, or make it appear better or of
greater value than it is, when the allegedly adulterated food is compared with any
proper standard.
The basic difference between the two interpretations is that in the former the
standard of the familiar recognizable food is read into the statute whereas in the latter
the courts must look outside the statute to find the standards used to determine adulteration.
60. The only reason to interpret food as the familiar recognizable food is to provide
a standard for determining economic adulteration. The reason for such an interpretation
therefore disappears if a standard other than the standard of the familiar recognizable
food is applicable in economic adulteration cases.
61. Both the word "food" in § 402(b) and the definitioa of food in § 201(f) are
inherently broader than familiar recognizable foods. The word and definition include
all foods, whether familiar or new, and all ingredients of such foods, many of which
would be neither familiar nor recognizable. See 52 Stat. 1041 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 321 (f)
(1958). Additionally, the interpretation of food as the alkgedly adulterated product
rather than the familiar recognizable food is more consistent with the other adulteration prohibitions in § 402(a) and (c). These sections provide a food is adulterated if
it bears poisonous substances, unsafe food or color additives or if it consists of filthy
or putrid substances or is prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions or is the
product of a diseased animal. 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) and
(c) (1958). Congress clearly intended that these basic prohibitions against dangerous
foods were to apply to all allegedly adulterated foods whether or not they were familiar
recognizable foods. It seems likely that the word "food" vas intended to have the
same broad meaning throughout § 402.
62. 187 F.2d 967 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951). The Bireley's case
was reviewed at 100 U. PA. L. Rv. 139-41 (1951).
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of 6% orange juice, 2% lemon juice, 87% water, and small quantities
of other harmless substances, including artificial coloring. The Govern-.
ment's theory was that the jury could examine the beverage and decide
the percentage of orange juice which the beverage appeared to contain.
If that percentage exceeded 6%, the government argued the beverage
was adulterated because it appeared better than it was. 3 The Government therefore wanted to judge Bireley's Orange Beverage by its own
appearance rather than by comparison with a familiar recognizable food."4
The claimant argued the precise opposite. The claimant's position
was that food in section 402 (b) meant a familiar recognizable food
and that this was the only standard which could be used in economic
adulteration cases. 5 The Government prevailed in the lower court but
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed."8 The opinion of the
Court of Appeals is notable in several respects. The court first held
that the interpretation of food in section 402 (b) depends upon the
facts of each individual case. In a prior case, the court noted that
food had been interpreted as the allegedly adulterated food itself and
the court reasoned that this could not be considered an improper or
surprising conclusion in relation to the facts involved. Conversely, the
court reasoned that food might also mean a r~cognized food rather
than the allegedly adulterated product if different facts were presented."7
The court had more difficulty determining the standard to be
applied in Bireley's case. The standard urged by the Government, the
per cent of orange juice which appeared to be in the allegedly adulterated
beverage, was considered by the court to be vague, speculative and
whimsical. 8 The court therefore accepted the claimant's argument that
Bireley's Orange Beverage should be compared against a defined,
familiar and superior food. The only relevant food was undiluted
orange juice and the court remanded the case to the lawer court for
63. The trial court's charge to the jury is reported at 2 Kleinfeld 128-37. The
trial court charged the jury at the request of the Government, "It is for you to decide,
upon all of the evidence, first: whether the yellow coal-tar dyes make the article look

like a product composed entirely or in large part of a fresh orange juice." Id. at 134.
The portion of the charge permitting the jury to conclude the product was adulterated

if it appeared to be in large part orange juice was reversible error. See Nelson, What
Standard For the Non-standardized Food? -

The Bireley's Case, 8

FoOD DRUG CosM.

L.J. 425, 435 (1953).
64. The claimant contended that if the Government were right and the jury could

speculate whether the product was in large part orange juice, the statute was un-

constitutionally vague. The court never reached that issue because it rejected the
Government's interpretation. Nelson, supra note 63 at 434.
65.

See note 57 supra.

66. United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F2d 967 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951).
67. Id. at 970-71.
68. Id. at 972.

FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
a trial on the issue of whether Bireley's Orange Beverage would be
confused with undiluted orange juice by the ordinary consumer. The
court stated, "The difficulty with this entire approach [the approach
urged by the Government] is that the 'adulteratcd' food is made to
serve as its own only standard.... Without a finding that a marketable
inferior product is likely to be confused with a specified superior
counterpart, we think there can be no appearing 'better than it is' within
the scope of disapproval of a section patently conc,.rned only with confusion."
This dicta must be viewed in the context of the facts of the
Bireley's case. In Bireley's the court was faced with a choice between
two standards. One (the percent of orange juice which appeared to
be in the drink) was speculative while the other (undiluted orange
juice) was concrete. Under these circumstances the court quite correctly chose the concrete standard.
Despite the contrary assumption by one court, 7 Bireley's does not
necessarily exclude from economic adulteration law a standard which is
both derived from the allegedly adulterated food and is also definite and
concrete. No such standard was before the court in Bireley's and the
court's dicta cannot be considered as binding on that issue."' To determine whether that type of standard is permissible, it is necessary to consider the nature of economic adulteration.
The essence of economic adulteration is sale of a food which appears to be superior to its actual composition."2 The deceptive appear69. Ibid.
70. See United States v. Fabro, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 523, 526 (M.D. Ga. 1962)
which is reviewed in more detail in text accompanying notes 141-44 infra.
71. The material allegations of the Government's libel in the Bireley's decision
were that the beverage appeared to be composed entirely or in large part of fresh
orange juice. See United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley Orange Beverage, 2 Kleinfeld
128, 130 (D.N.J. 1949), reversed, 187 F.2d 967 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861
(1951). When the court decided that adulteration could not result from the beverage
appearing to be composed in large part of orange juice, the only issue remaining was
whether the beverage appeared to be composed entirely of orange juice and the court
ordered a trial on that issue.
72. No food can be adulterated except by comparison with some standard. See
United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967 (3d Cir.), cert.
denicd, 342 U.S. 861 (1951); United States v. Goodman, White & Gates 484 (E.D.N.Y.
1913). In general, a standard becomes relevant to an economic adulteration charge because the allegedly adulterated food by its appearance expressly or impliedly represents
that it complies with the standard. Cf. United States v. Nesbitt Fruit Products, Inc.,
96 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1938). The one exception involves situations in which natural
foods, sold as such, have been diluted. Courts then hold th t the dilution constitutes
economic adulteration not because the food fails to equal the standard set by its
appearance; but simply because, contrary to the expectations of purchasers and consumers, the food has been diluted. See text accompanying notes 129-36 infra.
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ance of the food is analogous to a misrepresentation', or a fraudulent
concealment of material facts in a sales transaction. 4 However, the
remedy chosen by Congress to correct economic adulteration was, in
general, not limited to a disclosure of the actual facts through labeling.75
On the contrary, with the possible exception of labels prominently identifying the food as an imitation, truthful labeling is at most only one
of many considerations in determining whether a food is economically
adulterated.76
Truthful labeling was rejected as a complete defense to economic
adulteration charges for two reasons: first, because many purchasers
purchase food by its general appearance without reading the detailed
information on the label," and, second, because truthful labeling could
73. The misrepresentation analogy is most obvious in cases involving false ingredient statements. However, implied misrepresentations are probably present when
a food appears to be a familiar recognizable food or appears to be equal to its former
composition, or appears to be a natural undiluted food, and the contrary is true.
74. A fraudulent concealment of material facts probably occurs when a seller, by
altering the composition of a recognized food or by intentionally creating a new food
in the appearance of a recognized food, conceals the inferiority of his product. Cf.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS,

§ 550 (1938) ;

PRossER,

ToRTS 532-33 (2d ed. 1955). Similarly a

fraudulent concealment of material facts probably occurs if a seller debases his own
familiar proprietary and conceals the inferiority by offering it in its former container
and with its former name and label. Cf. ibid.; Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281
Fed. 744 (2d Cir. 1922). There is more than nondisclosure in such situations; there is
affirmative action designed to prevent the purchaser from discovering the inferiority
of the new products. It is as if the seller false stated, "Here is the familiar recognizable food" or "Here is my familiar proprietary food."
75. United States v. 36 Drums of Pop'N Oil, 164 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1947);
United States v. Two Bags of Poppy Seeds, 147 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1945); see also
United States v. 716 Cases of Del Comida Brand Tomatoes, 179 F.2d 174 (10th Cir.
1950); cf. Federal Security Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943); United
States v. arolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) ; Willis, Preve),ing Economic
Adulteration of Food, 1 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.Q. 20, 25 (1946) : "It is clear from the
cases that where a food product is inherently deceptive so that it may tend to mislead
or confuse the ultimate consumer, label statements may not be relied upon to correst
its deceptive character."
76. See ibid. Labeling may be a defense to an economic adulteration charge if
it is adequate and effective notice that the food is an imitation or a different generic
product. While it is difficult to cite precedent for this proposition other than the
analogous 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 108 (1951) (which involved §
403(g) rather than § 402(b) of the act), it is apparent that a number of foods are
now sold under such labeling without challenge by the Government and have been for
some time. Consider, for example, soft drinks with artificial sweeteners, non-dairy coffee
lighteners, and vegetable whipping bases. All of these foods would be economically
adulterated except for labeling which distinguishes them as different generic products
from their more traditional counterparts and the Government, by permitting their
widespread sale, has in fact accepted such labeling as sufficient. If the labeling does
not identify the food as a different generic product, the labeling is only one consideration in deciding whether the food is adulterated.
77. Cf. "Experience had shown that truthful labeling of a product was no protection to the bulk of the consuming public; if a product gave the appearance of being a
certain food, the public assumed that it contained only those ingredients which were
commonly associated with that food and the label was never consulted." United States v.
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be separated from the food at some later point in the distribution system
8
and the adulterated food then passed off on unsuspecting purchasers.
The burden was therefore placed upon sellers to refrain from creating
9
and selling foods which have a deceptive appearance.'
The classic economic adulteration cases involve the issue of whether
the food appears to the ordinary purchaser and consumer to be a superior
food. 0 Such cases rest upon a comparison of the appearance of the
306 Cases of Sandford Tomato Catsup With Preservative, 55 F. Supp. 725, 726
(E.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd, 148 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1945).
78. Cf. United States v. 36 Drums of Pop'N Oil, 164 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1947),
in which the court noted that the popped corn with oil on it was not accompanied
by any ingredient statement. As H. Thomas Austern has stated, "Except on camping
trips, food is seldom served in the original container. Very often it is so happily prepared that one hasn't the vaguest notion of the identity of what he is eating.
It is this apprehension which leads to the idea of things being inherently deceptive:
the assumption that a manufacturer who departs from a pre.;cribed composition in an
identity standard may have in mind creating an opportunity for a restauranteur, the
proprietor of a boarding house, or the operator of a loggixg camp to pass off the
different product on his unsuspecting patrons or employees. Even if he isn't, he is
hanged by the possibility. The producer of the food may be acting honestly and labeling
forthrightly, but he is restricted because of the venality of others." Austern, Section
403(9) Revisited, 6 FoOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 181, 187-88 (1951). However, the courts
have not generally held that the possibility of passing off by restaurants to their customers is enough. See text accompanying notes 223-26 infra.
79. This type of restriction is not unique or unconstitutional. United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), involved a compoumd of condensed skimmed
milk and coconut oil which was banned from interstate coamerce under the Filled
filk Act. The district court sustained a demurrer and the United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the statute was constitutional and that it was for the
legislature to determine whether the public would be adequately protected by a prohibition of false labels or whether it was necessary to go furthei and prohibit entirely the
sale of substitute food-products which were inferior to and indistinguishable from,
natural milk. See also Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919) (opinion by Holmes, J.
upholding the constitutionality of an Ohio statute prohibitiing the sale of condensed
skimmed milk from which cream was removed); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678
(1888) (upholding a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the sak of substitutes for butter
made from animal fats). All of these cases involved wholesome foods which were
prohibited despite truthful labeling.
Perhaps the most difficult constitutional case was Carolenle Products Co. v. United
States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944), in which the seller sold a product consisting of skimmed
The product was as
milk plus cottonseed or coconut oil and added vitamins
nutritious as milk; was honestly labeled, and was sold in its natural color which
was indistinguishable from milk. The defendant argued that (1) the legislative history
of the Filled Milk Act indicated it was directed at foods which were nutritionally
inferior to milk and that therefore his product was outside te act; and (2) the Filled
.Milk Act was directed at foods which were artificially prep ired to simulate milk and
that he had not altered the natural appearance of his food. The Court held that in the
Filled Milk Act Congress was concerned with confusion, and defendant's product must
be banned because, whatever its nutritional qualities might be, it would be confused
with milk. The Court also held that the Filled Milk Act ws directed at all mixtures
which simulate milk whether or not they were conscious and purposeful simulations.
80. See cases cited note 88 infra. These cases are called classic economic adulteration because they are similar to the "Bred Spred" case arid the other adulteration
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allegedly adulterated food with the appearance of a food which is both
familiar and recognizable to the ordinary purchaser and consumer.8
If the labeling of the allegedly adulterated food suggests that it is a
familiar recognizable food, the case is easier. In such cases, the possibility
of passing-off is immediate rather than remote and the courts will have
little difficulty in declaring the food adulterated by comparison with
the standard of the familiar recognizable food. 2
Other economic adulteration cases have involved a comparison of
the allegedly adulterated food with a standard set by the allegedly adulterated food itself. Usually such cases have involved ingredient statements which suggest the food is better than it is-e.g. a label stating
that the food contains 25% olive oil when in fact it contains almost no
olive oi1--but there is also reason to believe that, under certain circumstances, an allegedly adulterated food may be judged by a standard it
has set through secondary meeting"4 or through its natural composition."5
cases which were in large part responsible for the passage of the economic adulteration
sections of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
81. See note 72 supra.
82. Most of the cases have involved labeling which falsely suggested that the
product complied with a standard of identity rather than economic adulteration cases
involving familiar recognizable foods. See United States v. 30 Cases of Leader Brand
Strawberry Fruit Spread, 93 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Iowa 1950); cf. United States v. 306
Cases of Sandford Tomato Catsup with Preservative, 55 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.Y. 1944),
aff'd, 148 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1945), holding that claimant's designation "Tomato Catsup
With Preservative," was not an arbitrary or fanciful name but a designation which
suggested what the food really was-tomato catsup; United States v. 20 Cases of Buitoni
209o Protein Spaghetti, 130 F. Supp. 715 (D. Del. 1954), aff'd, 228 F.2d 912 (3d Cir.
1956) (per curiam); United States v. Omar Inc., 91 F. Supp. 121 (D. Neb. 1950),
holding that the distinction between "vitamin rich farina" and "enriched farina" is a
very thin line to draw if the consumer is to receive any protection from standards of
identity. Logic and one Supreme Court case suggest the courts will reach the same
results in economic adulteration cases. See United States v. Schider, 246 U.S. 519, 521-22
(1918), holding, "The obvious and undisputed purpose and effect of the label was to
declare the -bottled article a compound essence of grade.... Within the statute's general
terms the article must be deemed adulterated since some other substance had been substituted wholly for the one indicated by the label...."
83. See United States v. 40 Cases of Pinocchio Brand Oil, 289 F.2d 343 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 831 (1961), and cases cited note 138 infra.
84. Cf. United States v. 702 Dozen Bottles of 666, 1 Kleinfeld 89 (M.D. Ga.
1944); Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 Fed. 744 (2d Cir. 1922).
United States v. 70Y2 Dozen Bottles of 666, supra, involved a drug called "666"'
which had been known and sold to the public for many years as a drug containing iron
and quinine. The manufacturer eliminated the iron and quinine and sold the drug under
the same name and in the same style packages to the public. The drug was held misbranded.
Similarly, in Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, stupra, the respondent had manufactured and sold a baking powder with cream of tartar called "Dr. Price's Cream
Baking Powder" for many years. When the cost of the cream of tartar increased, respondent changed the composition of its product from a cream of tartar powder to a
phosphate powder, selling the new product under the same name and in the same style
package and the FTC brought an action under § 5 of the FTC Act. The FTC ordered
respondent to cease and desist selling a phosphate baking powder under the name of
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The ingredient cases alone are numerous enough to make it clear that,
contrary to the dicta in Bireley's, allegedly adulterated foods can set
their own standards and may be judged by these standards in economic
adulteration cases. 8 Bireley's must therefore be read as merely requiring
that the standards applied in economic adulteration cases be reasonably
87
definite and precise.
Both standards set by the allegedly adulterated food itself and
standards set by a familiar recognizable food are reviewed below.
C. Tlw Standards Used To Determine Economic Adulteration
And The Evidence Required to Prove Eachi Standard.
1. The Familiar Recognizable Food:
The familiar recognizable food is the standard which has been applied most frequently in economic adulteration cases.8 8 The standard
"Dr. Price's" or "Price's" unless the word "Cream" was omiti ed and the word "Phosphate" was incorporated in the label. Respondent was also ordered to cease and desist
using any label simulating or resembling in coloration, design or general appearance the
labels formerly used on its cream of tartar powder. The court affirmed the FTC's
order holding that

......

petitioner in the use of its labels and otherwise ....

did deceive

the public, into buying a phosphate baking powder believing it was Dr. Price's Baking
Powder which had been well known for 60 years as a cream of tartar powder, concealing
and obscuring the fact that it was a radically different powder." Id. at 753.
In both cases the fraud related to the composition of the product and the Government might have succeeded had it brought economic adulteratic n charges.
85. See cases cited note 130 infra.
86. See cases cited notes 137-38 infra.
87. One court has rejected an ingredient statement as the standard in an economic
adulteration case, basing its decision on Bireley's. United Statcs v. Fabro, 206 F. Supp.
523 (M.D. Ga. 1962). However, the weight of authority is to the contrary. See United
States v. 40 Cases of Pinocchio Brand Oil, 289 F.2d 343 (21 Cir), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 831 (1961); United States v. Food Products Labs., Inc., 6 Kleinfeld 123 (W.D.
Mo. 1963). Cf. Nelson, What StandardsFor the Nonstandardzed Food? - The Bireley's Case, 8 FOOD DRUG Cosx. L.J. 425, 438 (1953); Develo ments in the La -The
Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 67 HARv. L. Rsv. 632, 648 (1954): "[I]nsofar
as the decision [Bireley] immunizes from adulteration charges a certain product which,
though deceptive in appearance, could not be confused with an identified superior, it
would seem to deny the consumer the full protection the act intended."
88. Cases involving alleged economic adulteration by comparison of the food
with a familiar recognizable food are almost infinite in number and numerous cases
are collected in this footnote. With few exceptions, however, the decisions in these
cases rest upon simple findings of fact or points of law 1aving little relevance to
economic adulteration charges. M1any of the 1906 Act cases, for example, turn upon the
interpretation of the provisos relating to distinctive names and compounds (which were
abolished in the 1938 Act) and many of the later cases were actually decided on misbranding charges rather than the economic adulteration charges. The principal value
of the list is therefore to enable members of the profession to find cases involving
particular foods easily and quickly. The cases are: United Stites v. Schider, 246 U.S.
519 (1918) (grape essence) ; Van Liew v. United States, 321 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1963)
(orange juice) ; United States v. Treffinger, 224 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1955) (horseradish) ;
United States v. 716 Cases of Del Comida Brand Tomatoes, 179 F.2d 174 (10th Cir.
1950 (canned tomatoes) ; United States v. 36 Drums of Pop'"l Oil, 164 F.2d 250 (5th
Cir. 1947) (popped corn flavoring); United States v. Two Lags of Poppy Seeds, 147
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consists of a single superior food which is both known ("familiar") to
retail purchasers and identifiable ("recognizable") by them.8" The
F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1945) (poppy seeds); United States v. 800 Sacks Barley Mixed
Oats, 64 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1933) (oats); United States v. Centralia Dairy Co., 60
F.2d 141 (W.D. Wash. 1932) (butter); V.B. Wood Mfg. Co. v. United States, 286
Fed. 84 (7th Cir. 1923) (food colors) ; F.B. Washburn v. United States, 224 Fed. 395
(1st Cir. 1915) (macaroons); Libby, McNeill & Libby v. United States, 210 Fed. 148
(4th Cir. 1913) (condensed skimmed milk); Lexington Mill & Elevator Co. v. United
States, 202 Fed. 615 (8th Cir. 1913), aff'd, 232 U.S. 399 (1914) (flour) ; Hall-Baker
Grain Co. v. United States, 198 Fed. 614 (8th Cir. 1912) (No. 2 wheat); William Henning & Co. v. United States, 193 Fed. 52 (5th Cir. 1912) (tomato catsup); United
States v. W. F. Morgan, 155 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Va. 1957) and 155 F. Supp. 847 (E.D.
Va. 1957) (canned oysters); United States v. Cudahy Packing Co., 4 Kleinfeld 138
(D. Neb. 1955) (oleomargarine); United States v. 149 Cans of Black Eyed Peas, 4
Kleinfeld 27 (D. Colo. 1953) (canned peas); United States v. 70 Gross Bottles of
Quenchies, 3 Kleinfeld 141 (S.D. Ohio 1952) (soft drink base) ; United States v. Midfield Packers, 3 Kleinfeld 157 (W.D. Wash. 1947) (frozen fruit) ; United States v.
Beck, 2 Kleinfeld 197 (S.D. Iowa 1948) (salad dressing); United States v. 55 Cases
of Popped Corn, 62 F. Supp. 843 (D. Idaho 1943) (popped corn); United States v.
South Peacham Creamery Co., White & Gates 1266 (D. Vt. 1931) (butter); United
States v. Morehouse, White & Gates 1210 (N.D. Cal. 1928) (mustard seed); United
States v. 4Y Cases of Creme De Menthe, White & Gates 1191 (E.D. Mo. 1926) (creme
de menthe); United States v. 200 Sacks of Wheat Middlings, White & Gates 1189
(E.D. Mich. 1926) (powdered wheat middlings); United States v. 24 ys Gallons of
Smack, White & Gates 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1926) (grape juice); United States v. 37 OnePound Packages of Colors, White & Gates 1165 (E.D. Pa. 1925) (food colors) ; United
States v. Marmarelli, White & Gates 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (olive oil) ; United States
v. Krumm, 269 Fed. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1921) (macaroni); United States v. Alban, White
& Gates 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (olive oil) ; United States v. 100 Cases of Canned Red
Kidney Beans, White & Gates 982 (W.D. Ky. 1920) (kidney beans); United States
v. 6 Barrels of Ground Pepper, White & Gates 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (pepper) ; United
States v. Shucart, White & Gates 693 (E.D. Mo. 1915) (cider) ; United States v. 60 Barrels of Wine, 225 Fed. 846 (W.D. Mo. 1915) (claret wine) ; United States v. 6 Cases of
Honey, White & Gates 543 (E.D. Pa. 1913) (honey) ; United States v. Goodman, White
& Gates 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1913) (nonalcoholic cordial); United States v. German American Specialty Co., White & Gates 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (eggs); United States v.
Huyler's, White & Gates 455 (Police Ct. D.C. 1913) (maple sugar); United States
v. Dunham Mfg. Co., White & Gates 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1913) (shredded coconut); United
States v. 30 Cases of Grenadine Syrup, 199 Fed. 932 (D. Mass. 1912) (grenadine
syrup); United States v. Auerbach & Sons, White & Gates 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1912) (milk
chocolate); United States v. 75 Boxes of Alleged Pepper, 198 Fed. 934 (D. N.J. 1912)
(pepper) ; United States v. 100 Barrels of Vinegar, 188 Fed. 471 (D. Minn. 1911)
(vinegar); United States v. Heide, White & Gates 325 (S.D.N.Y. (1911) (almond
paste) ; United States v. Rinchini, White & Gates 318 (D. Ariz. 1911) (ice cream);
United States v. 100 Barrels of Calcium Acid Phosphate, White & Gates 58 (N.D.
Cal. 1909) (calcium and phosphate).
89. The leading economic adulteration case, United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's
Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951), refers to
the standard as a "defined and familiar food." The food certainly must be familiar to
purchasers (or else there can be no deception), but the use of the word "defined" is
somewhat misleading. The test is not whether the food is defined in standards of
identity or by the trade; the test is -whether the food is recognized by the ordinary
purchaser or consumer as a food containing certain ingredients (or a certain proportion
of ingredients) which the allegedly adulterated product does not have. Thus there may
be no complete definition of the food anywhere. Cf. United States v. 4Y2 Cases of Creme
De Menthe, White & Gates 1191 (E.D. Mo. 1926) in which the only issue was
whether creme de menthe was recognized as containing caffeine. It seems more precise therefore to refer to the standard as the "familiar recognizable food."
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food must not only be identifiable under ordinary conditions of purchase and use; it must also be identifiable generally in its composition."
The composition of the familiar recognizable food is defined according
to the common understanding of retail purchasers and consumers. 9
The familiar recognizable food is a generic food. It may be either
a standardized or unstandardized food, a natural or fabricated food.92
The standard is usually applied without comment or discussion by the
courts and consequently there is little understanding of the standard.
It seems likely that the common understanding of retail purchasers and
consumers is not a monolithic standard but that, on the contrary, a food
which purports to be a familiar recognizable food may arouse diverse
and conflicting expectations among substantial numbers of retail purchasers and consumers. If this is so, a food which appears to be a
familiar recognizable food but which falls short of the expectations of
almost all purchasers ought to be considered economically adulterated
even if there is a diversity of opinion concerning the usual composition
of the food. This was apparently the situation in United States v. 36
Drums of Pop'N Oil.93 In the Pop'N Oil case, the Government seized
drums of artificially-colored mineral oil intended for use as popped corn
seasoning. The court held the mineral oil was economically adulterated
because it was inferior to all of the oils (cottonseed, coconut and soyabean) which had previously been applied to popped corn."
90. United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, supra note 89; United
States v. Midfield Packers, 3 Kleinfeld 157 (W.D. Wash. 1952); United States v. 70
Gross Bottles of Quenchies, 3 Kleinfeld 141 (S.D. Ohio 1952); United States v. 55
Cases of Popped Corn, 62 F. Supp. 843 (D. Idaho 1943); United States v. 30 Cases
of Grenadine Syrup, 199 Fed. 932 (D. Mass. 1912). Cf. United States v. Swift & Co.,
White & Gates 1146 (D. Ore. 1925); United States v. Krumm, 269 Fed. 848 (E.D. Pa.
1921) ; United States v. 154 Cases of Tomatoes, White & Gatcs 967 (W.D. Pa. 1920) ;
United States v. Rinchini, White & Gates 318 (D. Ariz. 1911), are examples of cases
in which the Government was defeated because it failed to plead or prove the composition of a familiar recognizable food which differed from the composition of the
allegedly adulterated product.
91. See United States v. 42 Cases of Creme De Menthe, White & Gates 1191
(E.D. Mo. 1926); United States v. F. B. Washburn & Co., White & Gates 434 (D.
Mass. 1913), rev'd on other grounds, 224 Fed. 395 (1st Cir. 1915) ; United States v.
Auerbach & Sons, White & Gates 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); United States v. 30 Cases of
Grenadine Syrup, 199 Fed. 932 (D. Mass. 1912) ; United States v. 75 Boxes of Alleged
Pepper, 198 Fed. 934 (D. N.J. 1912) ; United States v. Bettmn-Johnson Co., White &
Gates 299 (S.D. Ohio 1911); cf. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. United States, 210 Fed.
148 (4th Cir. 1913).
92. See cases cited note 88 supra.
93. 164 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1947).
94. In United States v. 55 Cases of Popped Corn, 62 F. Supp. 843 (D. Idaho
1943) the Government had seized popped corn flavored with mineral oil because of
economic adulteration and the court had dismissed the seizure because there was no
established formula for the preparation of popped corn. The Pop'N Oil case, supra
note 93, only four years later, then held that variances in the formula were irrelevant
since all of the oils used had more food value than mineral oil. The different results
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More subtle questions arise when the food complies with the expectaticns of some of the purchasers and consumers concerning familiar
recognizable foods but falls short of the expectations of others. In
theory it would seem that a manufacturer who has created a food with
an appearance which may deceive any substantial number of purchasers
and consumers should not be able to defend an economic adulteration
charge by showing that other purchasers and consumers are not deceived. 5 However, the application of this principle to economic adulteration cases would yield startling results. Foods which complied with
the expectations of most purchasers and consumers could be outlawed
or required to be labeled imitation and, quite apart from the economic
consequences to manufacturers, more confusion than enlightenment would
probably result from such a situation. 6 Therefore, it is likely that the
in the two cases probably rest upon different evaluations of mineral oil by the two
courts. In the Popped Corn case, the court did not know whether mineral oil had been
used before but knew of no reason why mineral oil should not be used. In the Pop'N
Oil case, the court recognized mineral oil as new and inferior to all other oils formerly
used for flavoring popped corn. Therefore, regardless of whether mineral oil was
deleterious, its use on popped corn was deceptive to purchasers and consumers and
the court correctly found economic adulteration.
9b. Certainly if the same manufacturer deceived a substantial number of purchasers and consumers 'by a false or misleading advertisement of the composition of
the food, he could be subject to a cease and desist order issued by the Federal Trade
Commission. See 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (1964) ; Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 CoLuM. L. REv. 439,
457-62 (1964). The fact that other customers were satisfied or not deceived would
be no defense to the cease and desist proceeding if the advertisement had the capacity
to deceive. Cf. Erickson v. FTC, 272 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
940 (1960) ; Independent Directory Corp. v. FTC, 188 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1951). It can
be argued that the manufacturer should also be liable under economic adulteration law
if instead of publishing a deceptive advertisement, he creates an inferior food having
an appearance which will deceive a substantial number of purchasers.
The distinction probably lies in the two statutes. The FTC Act is very flexible and
the FTC can fashion orders to individual cases so that the deception is ended and the
manufacturer is able to continue to sell his products. The Federal Food, Drug, &
Cosmetic Act gives no comparable power to the FDA and therefore if the food is
considered economically adulterated, it must be either labeled imitation or removed
from sale.
96. The economic adulteration sections of the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic
,Act are constructed on the premise that there is only one genuine version of each
familar recognizable food. These sections therefore require the seller to either label
any other version as an imitation or refrain from selling it. Cf. United States v. 62
Cases of Jam, 340 U.S. 593 (1951).
When it becomes apparent that there are several versions of the familiar recognizable food, all of which vary in quality and all of which are regarded as genuine by
some members of the public, the law becomes totally inadequate. In such circumstances,
the courts must either force the manufacturers to label as imitation a food which some
purchasers and consumers regard as genuine, or, the courts must simply not apply the
economic adulteration laws to the various versions of the food and leave the purchaser
to protect himself by reading the ingredient statement. The courts have usually handled
such situations by holding that the standard is too indefinite to hold any of the
versions of the food economically adulterated. See cases-cited note 97 infra. The purchasers are thus left to rely upon labeling although the judicial consensus seems to be

FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
courts will hold that where a difference of opinion exists concerning

the composition of the familiar recognized food, the allegedly adulterated
food is not adulterated so long as a substantial number of ordinary purchasers and consumers consider it within the definition of the familiar
recognizable food."7 Protection of purchasers and consumers with higher
expectations will be limited to the misbranding sections of the act, although this may require that they read ingredient statements until the
Government promulgates standards of identity defining the food."8 The
standards of identity end- the controversy concerning the proper composition of the food, so far as the misbranding sections of the act are
concerned." The effect of standards of identity upon economic adulteration cases is, however, more dubious and this and other evidentiary
problems are reviewed below.
that labeling is inadequate protection for purchasers. Cf. Federal Security Adm'r
v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943); United States v. 306 Cases of Sandford
Tomato Catsup With Preservative, 55 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd, 148 F.2d
71 (2d Cir. 1945). However, in at least one analogous situatk n, a federal agency tried
the "imitation" labeling route and this was found equally inadequate. See Armour &
Co. v. Freeman, 304 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 370 U.S. 920 (1962) in which
it was regarded as deceptive to, label ham with added water as imitation ham.
97. Probably the two most recent relevant authorities are United States v. 70
Gross Bottles of Quenchies, 3 Kleinfeld 141 (S.D. Ohio 1952) and United States v. 55
Cases of Popped Corn, 62 F. Supp. 843 (D. Idaho 1943). In the former case there
was apparently a difference of opinion whether soft drink bases should be sweetened
with sugar or saccharin while in the latter case there was a difference of opinion
whether popped corn should be flavored with butter, vegetable oils or mineral oils. In
both cases the court concluded the products were not adulterated. However, the same
approach is inherent in those cases which define the familiar recognizable food according to the common understanding of purchasers and consumers, cf. authorities cited
note 91 supra, since it can be argued, there is no common understanding when substantial groups of purchasers and consumers dissent.
98. Establishing a standard of identity is probably the best approach when differences of opinion exist concerning the proper composition of the food. The procedure
for establishing a standard of identity is set forth in § 701 of the act and, briefly,
it consists of a proposal for a standard initiated by the Secretry of Health, Education,
and Welfare or by any interested person, publication of the proposal and an opportunity
to file written objections and request a public hearing, a public hearing at which
evidence may be presented, and publication of a final order subject to court review.
52 Stat 1055 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)-(f) (1953). While this procedure
is time-consuming, it provides an opportunity for all interested persons to voice their
opinion concerning the proper composition of the food, and provides the basis for
establishing a reasonable standard of identity which will "promote honesty and fair
dealing in the interest of consumers." See 52 Stat 1046 (193S), as amended, 21 U.S.C.
§ 341 (1958). The public hearing and the publicity concerning the controversy over the
proper composition of the food may also make a small contribution to the education of
some purchasers and consumers. Cf. The Second Citizens Advisory Committee Report
on the Food and Drug Administration, 17 FooD DRUG Cosz~i. L.J. 587, 597-99 (1962).
wherein the committee stressed the need for education rath,!r than just prosecution.
Ultimately, if it were decided that there was more than one legitimate version of the
familiar recognizable food, the standard of identity could provide for optional ingredients, thus preserving the sellers' rights to sell both versions of the food.
99. 52 Stat. 1047 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 343(g) (1) (1958).
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:(a) Standards of Identity
Under section 401 of the act, the Secretary is authorized to
promulgate reasonable definitions and standards of identity and quality
for all foods."' This provision was inserted in the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act because of the Government's difficulties in proving
the composition of the familiar recognizable food in cases under the 1906
Act.' However, Congress did not provide in the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act that a food which failed to comply with a standard of
identity or quality was economically adulterated; instead Congress provided that such a food was misbranded. 2 This left open the question
of the effect of a standard of identity in an economic adulteration case.
In United States v. 30 Cases of Leader Brand Strawberry Fruit
100. 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 341 (1958).
101. On June 12, 1933, Senator Copeland introduced a bill which would have
completely revised the 1906 Food and Drugs Act; the revision, in amended form, was
ultimately enacted on June 25, 1938. See DUNN, FEDERAL FooD, DRUG, AND CosMExic Act
24-30 (1938). The authority to promulgate standards of identity for foods was part
of the original bill providing for the revision of the 1906 Act. See S. 1944, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1933). The early Senate Reports of the bills providing for the
proposed revision of the 1906 Food and Drugs Act made it clear that the standards of
identity were intended to apply in economic adulteration cases. See S. REP. No. 493, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1934) ; S. REP. No. 361, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1935) ; S. RP.
No. 646, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1935). (These reports are reprinted in DUNN, supra at 110-32, 237-66, and 477-90 respectively.) For example, S. REP. No. 646 stated:
"Paragraph (g) overcomes a serious deficiency of the present law which makes no provision for definitions and standards of identity for food, with the exception of one enacted 'by Congress defining butter. The absence of such authority has seriously handicapped
effective enforcement. The provisions of the law, as well as those of this bill, dealing
with so-called 'economic adulteration' that is, the cheapening of foods either through lessening the quantities of valuable constituents or through the substitution of cheaper constituents, require definitions and standards whereby the article can be judged. For example, under the law and under the bill, a food is defined as adulterated if any substance
has been mixed or packed with it so as to reduce its quality or strength, or if any substance has been substituted wholly or in part therefor. These provisions in themselves
imply the existence of definitions and standards of identity, since no one can tell when
an article is adulterated under them without first determining definitely what constitutes the unadulterated product." DUNN, supra at 480.
However, later legislative reports concerning the proposed revision of the 1906
Food and Drugs Act did not contain the same type of language, see H.R. Rep. No.
2755, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1935) (DUNN, supra at 550-65) ; S. Rep. No. 91, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1937) (DUNN, supra at 675-81); S. Rep. No. 152, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937) (DUNN, supra at 686-92); and H.R. Rep. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938)
(DuNN, supra at 815-33), although H.R. Rep. No. 152, for example, did note the
Government's difficulties in dealing with cheapened jams and that the standards of
identity would prevent this debasement in the future. (DUNN, supra at 819).
It seems plain therefore that Congress originally intended the standards of identity
to apply in economic adulteration cases but it is not clear whether Congress later retreated from that position, intending the misbranding remedy alone to govern.
102. Foods which fail to conform to a standard of identity are misbranded (unless
labeled imitation); foods which fail to conform to a standard of quality are misbranded unless labeled that they fall below the standard. 52 Stat. 1047 (1938), as
amended, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (g) (h) (1958).
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Spread,0 3 the Government seized claimant's "fruit spread" because
it was economically adulterated and because it violated the standards
of identity for jam. The evidence showed that claimant's product was
being passed off as jam and that ordinary purchasers would consider
it as jam but that claimant's product contained approximately 10%
fruit rather than the approximate 40% fruit required by the jam standards. The court concluded that the product wa3 both economically
adulterated and misbranded because it was represented to be and purported to be jam but failed to conform to the standards of identity for
jam.
In United States v. 716 Cases of Del Comida Brand Tomatoes,'""
the Government seized canned tomatoes because they were economically
adulterated and because they failed to conform to the standard of quality
for canned tomatoes. Both charges were based up)n the fact that the
tomatoes had been diluted with water. The trial court held that the
canned tomatoes were misbranded but not economically adulterated.
The Circuit Court reversed, holding that the tomatoes were economically
adulterated since the Act was intended to provide protection against the
substitution of less expensive ingredients, in whole or in part, for the
more expensive ingredients of familiar recognizable foods.'
The
standard of quality was accepted as proof of the proper composition of
canned tomatoes.
In neither the Leader Brand Strawberry Fridt Spread case nor
the Del Comida Tomatoes case did the courts discuss the effect of a
standard of identity or quality on an economic adulteration case. In these
cases involving obvious and deliberate frauds, the courts simply accepted
the standard as proof of the familiar recognizable food. The claimants
apparently did not contest either the admissibility of the standard or
the weight given to it.
A later case, United States v. Cudahy Packing Company,' involved
a contest of both questions. In the Cudahy ca e, the Government
brought criminal charges against a corporation for shipping oleomargarine which failed to contain the 80% fat required by the standards
of identity. The deficiency in the fat content cf defendant's oleomargarine was slight and inadvertent and the court concluded that the
oleomargarine was misbranded but not economically adulterated. The
court reasoned that economic adulteration consists of skimping upon
expensive ingredients and enlarging cheaper ingredients, and that this
103.
104.
105.
106.

93 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
179 F.2d 174 (10th Cir. 1950).
Ibid.
4 Kleinfeld 138 (D. Neb. 1955).
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offense had not been proved in the Cudahy case because there was no
evidence of the relative cost of the ingredients involved."0 7 The Government's contention that standards of identity can be used to support an
economic adulteration charge was rejected. The court held that since
the adulteration sections of the act do not refer to the standards of
identity as canons or tests, the standards are irrelevant to adulteration
08

cases.1

It is difficult to accept either the position that standards of identity
are conclusive upon, or irrelevant to, an economic adulteration case. Since
Congress provided for misbranding penalties for failure to comply with
the standards, it seems unlikely that the same offense was intended to
be an adulteration.' 0 However, proof of the ordinary or usual composition of a food is usually admitted in economic adulteration cases
and a standard of identity seems at least as good evidence of that composition as the custom of the trade."' The proper approach is probably
to accept the standard as evidence and let the courts determine according
to the facts of each individual case whether additional evidence of consumer expectations is required. If the facts indicate that the deficiency
107. In the Cudahy case, supra note 106, the defendant had apparently increased
the percentage of whole milk and decreased the percentage of cottonseed oil in the
oleomargarine. No evidence 'was introduced concerning the relative cost of these ingredients, and, unlike the Del Conidn case, supra note 104, involving watered tomatoes,
the court could not take judicial notice of the cost differential.
108. The court said "Another obstacle to conviction under Count I arises because
it assumes that resort may be had in support of a charge under Title 21 U.S.C.A.,
Section 342(b) (2) to 21 CFR Section 45.0(a) [the standard of identity for oleomargarine].... Unlike the section of the statute defining misbranding, (Title 21
U.S.C.A., Section 343(g) ) the section within which Count I was framed does not
refer to such regulatory definition or standard as a canon or test of adulteration," supra
note 106 at 147. The court cited Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. United States, 194 F.2d 935
(5th Cir. 1952) in support of this reasoning. In Bruce's Juices cans of blended pineapple and grapefruit juice were seized because the juices were decomposed. The
claimant argued that the condemnation was improper because no standards of identity
had been promulgated for the product and the court correctly concluded standards of
identity were irrelevant to the adulteration charge. The court in Cudahy thus traveled
far afield to find support for its reasoning.
109. If Congress intended to make the failure to conform to the standards an
adulteration, it would have been easy enough to do so expressly. Instead, and in contrast to the previously adopted laws and regulations of a number of states, Congress
chose the misbranding route. See Callaway, Current Problenms in Formidating Food
Standards, 2 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.Q. 124, 128 (1947). Violations of the Butter Act,
42 Stat. 1500 (1923), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 321(a) (1958), which requires 80 per
cent milk fat in butter have always been considered economic adulterations. See e.g.,
United States v. Centralia Dairy Co., 60 F.2d 141 (W.D. Wash. 1932); United States
v. South Hero Creamery Ass'n, White & Gates 1142 (D. Vt. 1925). However, the
Butter Act was enacted in 1923 (before Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug &
Cosmetic Act providing for misbranding penalties for failure to conform to a standard
of identity) and hence is only analogous precedent for the argument that the failure
to conform to a standard of identy is an economic adulteration.
110. See text accompanying notes 114-117 infra. The standard of identity would
seem better evidence than the custom of the trade since there is less deviation from it.
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from the standard involves a major or important ingredient, the courts
may well decide that purchasers would expect the omitted or reduced
ingredient in the food."' Conversely, if the facts show that the deficiency from the standard of identity is minor both nutritionally and
financially, the courts may decide that more evidence is required to
infer that purchasers expected to receive the omitted or reduced ingredient in the food." 2 This type of analysis would reconcile the apparently
conflicting decisions in the Leader Brand, Del Comida, and Cudah.y
3
cases.

11

(b) Custom of the Trade
In cases involving unstandardized foods, proof of the ordinary
or usual composition of a food is made through the testimony of competing food processors or chemical analyses of their products rather than
proof of a standard identity." 4 The evidence secured from the proces111. This is simply an issue of fact for the trial court. If, for example, the
standards require 40% fruit in jam and the allegedly adulterated food only contains
10% fruit, the deficiency is sufficient so that consumer expectations have probably

been violated. Cf. United States v. 30 Cases of Leader Brand Strawberry Fruit Spread,
93 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Iowa 1950); Markel, Federal Food Standards, 1 FooD DRUG
Cos,.%L.Q. 28, 42 (1946) in which the author suggests that tha nature of the deficiency
of the food when compared to the standard will determine whether it is economically
adulterated.
112. In the Cudahy case, supra note 106, defendant's margarine contained at least
73%o fat and averaged 79.85 fat as compared with an 80% standard. The deficiency
was apparently filled largely with nonfat dried milk. Neither substantial economic or
nutritional inferiority was therefore shown.
113. In the Del Condda, supra note 104, and Leader Brand Strawberry Fruit
Spread, supra note 103, cases, both elements were present: (1) substantial nutritional
inferiority of the adulterated food as compared with the fLmiliar recognizable food
and (2) substantial economic inferiority of the adulterated fRod as compared with the
familiar recognizable food. Both of the same elements wer,; missing in the Cudahy

case.
114. In cases involving unstandardized foods fabricated from two or more ingredients or natural foods packed or preserved with another ingredient, the Government usually proves the composition of the familiar recognizable food in part at least
by evidence of the custom of the trade. See, e.g., United States v. 36 Drums of Pop'N
Oil, 164 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1947) (custom of the trade was lo use butter or vegetable
oils rather than mineral oil to flavor popped corn); United States v. Two Bags of
Poppy Seeds, 147 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1945) (custom of the trade was to use Dutch
and Turkish rather than British India poppy seeds to decorate baked goods); United
States v. 149 Cases of Black Eyed Peas, 4 Kleinfeld 27 (D Colo. 1953) (custom oi
trade was to use less water than claimant in canned peas) ; United States v. 154 Cases
of Tomatoes, White & Gates 967 (W.D. Pa. 1920) (libel 6ismissed because Government failed to allege that custom of the trade was to exclude tomato pulp from canned
tomatoes); United States v. 60 Barrels of Wine, 225 Fed. 846 (W.D. Mo. 1915)
(custom of trade was to make claret wine from the entire grape rather than the
grape residue remaining after extraction of the juice) ; United States v. Golden & Co.,
White & Gates 1033 (Police Ct. D.C. 1922) (custom of the trade was to use less
water than claimant in canned oysters) ; United States v. Krumm, 269 Fed. 848 (E.D.
Pa. 1921) (libel dismissed, in part, because Government failed to allege that custom ot
the trade was to manufacture macaroni solely from semolina rather than flour); cf.
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sors or chemical analyses indicates the custom of the trade and is relevant to, but not determinative of, the composition of the familiar recognizable food. As one court said, "The standard set by the statute is
not what is customarily done by manufacturers but what is properly
done by them....""'

The custom of the trade is probably most apt

to be rejected when the evidence indicates that manufacturers are diluting foods to secure competitive advantage, rather than when evidence
indicates that the variation in ingredients has resulted from competing
manufacturers' attempts to make the food more nutritious or acceptable
to retail purchasers and consumers."1 ' In general, however, the custom
of the trade has been given great weight in economic adulteration cases
United States v. 30 Cases of Grenadine Syrup, 199 Fed. 932 (D. Mass. 1912) ; United
States v. Bettman-Johnson Co., White & Gates 299 (S.D. Ohio 1911). Put see W.B.
Wood Mfg. Co. v. United States, 292 Fed. 133 (8th Cir. 1923) in which the court
would not permit evidence of the custom of the trade.
Cases involving unstandardized natural foods not packed or preserved with
another ingredient are handled a little differently. The composition of unstandardized
natural foods is apt to be a matter of common knowledge and, when foreign ingredients
are introduced in the food, it is usually unnecessary to prove the composition of the
natural food. For example, olive oil is generally recognized as an oil extracted from
olives and when cottonseed oil is found in a container of olive oil, the debasement
is clear. See United States v. Germack, White & Gates 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1925); United
States v. Marmarelli, White & Gates 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) ; United States v. Alban,
White & Gates 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); United States v. Monahos, White & Gates 935
(S.D.N.Y. 1919); United States v. Paraskevopolus, White & Gates 925 (S.D.N.Y.
1919). Similar situations occur when horseradish is adulterated with parsnip, see United
States v. Treffinger, 224 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1955), or, eggs are adulterated with skimmed
milk, see United States v. German American Specialty Co., White & Gates 459 (S.D.N.Y.
1913). In some situations, however, the composition of the natural food is not obvious
and in such cases the custom of the trade becomes relevant. See United States v. 75
Boxes of Alleged Pepper, 198 Fed. 934 (D.N.J. 1912), in which the dispute was
whether the familiar recognizable food "pepper" properly consisted of black pepper
or long pepper.
Additionally, unstandarized natural foods are sometimes adulterated by increasing
the cheaper ingredients which occur naturally in the food and decreasing the more
valuable natural ingredients. If such foods fall below the consumers' expectations, they
could be considered adulterated under the standard of the familiar recognizable food
and evidence of the usual quantitative composition of such foods as sold by the trade
would be relevant if the Government applied the standard of the familiar recognizable
food to such cases. As a practical matter, however, the standard of the familiar recognizable food is not applied to such cases. Another more stringent standard based upon
the natural composition of these foods is applied and this standard makes the dilution
of the food illegal per se. See text accompanying notes 129-36 infra.
115. W.B. Wood Mfg. Co. v. United States, 292 Fed. 133, 134 (8th Cir. 1923).
See also United States v. 42 Cases of Creme De Menthe, White & Gates 1191, 1197
(E.D. Mo. 1926) : "It is not a question of what Tom, Dick or Harry put in there, because
Tom, Dick, or Harry may be violating the law themselves, but the question is, whether it
is a standard formula and whether this conforms to it."
116. See United States v. W.B. Wood Mfg. Co., White & Gates 1002 (E.D.
Mo. 1921), aff'd, 292 Fed 133 (8th Cir. 1923) in which the Government charged that
a red food color was being diluted by salt. The defendant wanted to prove that it was
customary to dilute food colors with salt and the court excluded this testimony, reasoning that the standard was not what was customarily done by manufacturers but what
was properly done by them.
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and the Government has usually found it necessary to prove that foods
are outside ordinary trade standards to secure judgments in economic
adulteration cases involving the standard of the familiar recognizable
food. 1 '
(c)

Opinion Surveys and Expert Testimony

Since the composition of the familiar recognizable food depends upon
the common understanding of retail purchasers and consumers, opinion
surveys and expert testimony concerning purchasers' and consumers'
expectations are often used in economic adulteration cases."'
The Government has relied upon opinion surveys in economic adulteration cases since at least 1911. In United States v. One Carload of
Corno Horse and illide Feed,"' the Government introduced evidence of
an opinion survey intended to prove that "oat feed" was generally
interpreted as ground oats rather than oat by products. The court decided that the survey deserved little weight because it purported to
show evidence of the opinion of the general public rather than of the
ordinary purchasers of the product."' Since the product in question,
mule feed, had a rather specialized and limited market, the court's conclusion was probably correct.
A more fundamental objection was raised to the Government's
opinion survey in United States v. 88 Cases of B reley's Orange Beverage.' " The claimant objected to the Government's survey as hearsay
and the court concluded that the survey was adrraissible since it was
offered to prove the reactions of the persons surveyed rather than the
117. The Food and Drug Administration in its 1933 report to the Department
of Agriculture summarized the situation as follows: "To prove that a product sold
within the jurisdiction of the Food and Drugs Act and that fails to comply with the
advisory standard is adulterated or misbranded, it is necessary for the Department to
present to the court and jury convincing evidence that the advisory standard does
represent the actual composition of the product expected by the consumer and recognized by the majority of the trade." DuNBAR, FEDERA.L FOD DRUG AND CosMric LAw
REPoRrs 1907-1949, 800 (1951). The Government can now promulgate legally binding
standards of identity, but in cases involving unstandardized foods, the same type of
evidence seems required today as was required in 1933.
118. United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967 (3d
Cir), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951) ; United States v. 70 Gross Bottles of Quenchies,
3 Kleinfeld 141 (S.D. Ohio 1952) ; United States v. One Carload of Corno Horse and
Mule Feed, 188 Fed. 453 (M.D. Ala. 1911). Analogous situations involving such evidence
include United States v. 174 Cases of Delson Thin Mints, 195 F. Supp. 326 (D.N.J.
1961), aff'd, 302 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1962) (misleading packaging) ; United States v.
254 Cases of Baby Brand Tomato Sauce, 63 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. Ark. 1945) (false and
misleading labeling); and Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1953),
rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 940 (1955) (F.T.C. deceptive advertising case).
119. 188 Fed. 453 (M.D. Ala. 1911).
120. Id. at 462.
121. 187 F.2d 967 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951).
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truth of their opinions." 2 The survey was of the opinion of householders and the public generally but the court did not indicate that
this affected the weight given to the survey, probably because Bireley's
Orange Beverage was a food which appealed to householders and the
public in general.' 23
Opinion surveys, if properly conducted, may be invaluable in cases
involving basic adulteration questions (e.g., whether the flavoring ingredient in popped corn is mineral oil, oleomargarine or butter), but
in more complex cases involving, for example, the percentages of ingredients in a food, a survey of ordinary -purchasers and consumers is
likely to produce no intelligible results."' In such cases, it would seem
more fruitful to introduce expert testimony concerning the understanding
of purchasers and consumers concerning the composition of a food. 2 '
Among the many experts who may shed light on this subject are
nutritionists and dieticians; food brokers, wholesalers and retailers;
restaurant proprietors and chefs; food processors and representatives
of trade associations of food processors, and housewives. 8 These wit122. Id. at 974.
123. In comparing the Corw case, supra note 119, and the Bireley's case, supra
note 121, it should be remembered that the public in general is a potential purchaser
and consumer of orange beverages while the public in general is not, to the same
degree, a potential purchaser of mule feed.
124. For example in United States v. 36 Drums of Pop'N Oil, 164 F.2d 250
(5th Cir. 1947) in which the issue was whether mineral oil was a proper flavoring for
popped corn, consumer surveys would probably have been helpful but in United States
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 4 Kleinfeld 138 (D. Neb. 1955) in which the issue was whether
oleomargarine should contain 799 or 809 fat, the survey would probably have produced no intelligible results.
125. One commentator has sumarized the identity factors of a food as follows:
The identity factors of any food are (1) composition, and (2) resulting
organoleptically determinable physical characteristics. These, in turn, are subdivided into(a) Qualitative
(1) Composition
(b) Quantitative
(a) Taste
(2) Resulting organoleptically
(b) Color
determinable physical
(c) Odor
characteristics
(d) Texture or consistency,
ranging from liquid to solid
See Markel, The Law On Imitation Food, 5 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 145, 166 (1950).
The expert can compare the qualitative and quantitative composition of the familiar
recognizable food and the allegedly adulterated product and describe the differences
in the organoleptically determinable physical characteristics of the two foods which
result from the differences in their composition. This type of testimony will better
enable the jury to understand the issues of the case and their importance. See United
States v. 4Y2 Cases of Creme de Menthe, White & Gates 1191 (E.D. Mo. 1926) for
this type of approach.
126. In United States v. 254 Cases of Baby Brand Tomato Sauce, 63 F. Supp.
916 (E.D. Ark. 1945), a misbranding case in which the principal issue was the proper
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nesses may be cross-examined and asked their opinion concerning statements of the composition of the food found in common reference books
such as recipe books, dictionaries, and encyclopedias.j27 From the expert
testimony, the fact-finder may be able to construct the standard of the
familiar recognizable food. The resulting standard will reflect the
consensus of informed opinion rather than an understanding that is
common to retail purchasers and consumers and hence will be highly
artificial. However, it is a workable and fair standard and probably
the best possible in the absence of a standard of identity. 2
2. The Natural Composition of the Natw-al Food:
The natural foods, when sold as such, are subject to a standard
which may be more stringent than the standard of the familiar recognizable food."'D This standard is based upon the natural composition
of the particular lot of food involved and it prevents the deliberate
dilution of that lot to the level of the general average of that food.'
composition of tomato sauce, the witnesses included chemists employed by FDA and
competitors, a plant manager employed by a competitor, a bu3 er and sales manager of
a food wholesaler, a housewife, a chef, a restaurant manager, a partner of the defendant
canning company, the owner of a competing cannery, and two food brokers. Cf. The
nutritionists' testimony concerning the proper composition of farina in Federal Security
Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943) (appeal from a standard of identity).
In addition to experts on food in general, witnesses may te.tify who are authorities
on the particular food involved in the suit. Perhaps the best examples of this type of
testimony were the wine experts who testified concerning tl-e proper composition of
claret wine in United States v. 60 Barrels of Wine, 225 Fed. 846 (W.D. Mo. 1915),
basing their testimony upon the taste and smell of claimant's product.
127. See United States v. 254 Cases of Baby Brand Tomato Sauce, 63 F. Supp.
916 (E.D. Ark. 1945) for this type of cross-examination. In at least one older case,
United States v. 30 Cases of Grenadine Syrup, 199 Fed. 932 (D. Mass. 1912), dictionaries
seem to have been used directly as evidence of the proper composition of the food, but
this practice may raise hearsay problems. Cf. McCoRamcx, EvIDENcE 620-21 (1954).
128. The definition of the familiar recognizable food covld be derived from three
different sources-the Government, the trade, or the purchasers and consumers of the
food. When the Government has failed to promulgate standa :ds, either the custom of
the trade or the expectations of purchasers and consumers must govern. Since the
trade in general could be deliberately debasing food for eco lomic advantage, the expectations of purchaser and consumers, difficult as they may be to define, seem the best
possible test.
129. The standard of the familiar recognizable food reflects the common understanding of purchasers and consumers. See cases cited in note 91 supra. Where there
is a difference in expectations among purchasers, the food is probably not adulterated
unless it falls outside the expectations of all substantial groups of purchasers. See text
accompanying notes 95-97 supra. It thus follows that if water were added to milk, the
milk would probably not be adulterated under the familiar recognizable food standard
unless it contained considerably more water than all substantial groups of purchasers
and consumers would ordinarily anticipate. This is in contrast to the standard described
in text accompanying notes 129-36 infra which makes the Addition of any water to
milk illegal.
130. United States v. 154 Sacks of Oats, 283 Fed. 985 (W.D. Va. 1922), modified,
294 Fed. 340 (W.D. Va. 1923); United States v. Heimann, White & Gates 840 (E.D.
Ill. 1917) are the cases which best illustrate this rule. However, support can also be
derived for this rule from Union Dairy Co. v. United States, 250 Fed. 231 (7th Cir.
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Assume, for example, that Farmer X's cows consistently produce milk
with more than the average percent of butterfat. If Farmer X abstracts
the "extra" butterfat, reducing his milk to the general average of milk
" '
sold, he may be held guilty of economic adulteration.18
Or, assume
that Farmer X's fields consistently produce oats with less weeds, dust
and chaff than the general average of oats sold. If Farmer X adds
additional weeds, dust and chaff to his oats, reducing his oats to the
level generally sold, he may be held guilty of economic adulteration." 2
Even more surprising, Farmer X's milk and oats which have been made
exactly equivalent to the general average of the food in the market
may be seized because they are economically adulterated.'
This reasoning which seems paradoxical on its face takes on more
logic when viewed in the light of the history and purposes of the act.
Both the 1906 Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938 were intended to prevent tampering with and debasement of
foods.'
There is no social good to be achieved from the purposeful
debasement of superior natural foods to the level of the general average." 5 Indeed, if every producer of superior foods reduced his foods
to average, then either the Government would have to seize all belowaverage foods or the average would be constantly falling and the con1918) ; United States v. Tetz, White & Gates 917 (W.D. Wash. 1919) ; United States
v. Taylor, White & Gates 839 (S.D. Ill. 1917) ; and United States v. Griebler, White &
Gates 29 (E.D. Ill. 1908). In these cases the courts treated the addition of water to
milk as illegal per se. Cf. United States v. Six Barrels of Ground Pepper, White &
Gates 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) in which the claimant had intermixed pepper shells with
pepper. Although the claimant's product still met the United States Department of
Agriculture's chemical standards for pepper, the deliberate dilution of the product with
pepper shells was illegal.
131. Cf. United States v. Heimann, White & Gates 840, 841 (E.D. Ill. 1917) in
which the court said: "The evidence shows that not all cows are uniform in the
amount of butterfat which their milk contains-whatever it does contain, that the
shipper should ship the whole milk without any abstraction of any part of it."
132. See United States v. 154 Sacks of Oats, 283 Fed. 985 (W.D. Va. 1922),
modified, 294 Fed. 340, W.D. Va. 1923), in which claimant deliberately added weed
seeds, chaff and dust to his oats until the product just met the standard for oats provided by the Grain Standards Act.
133. In both United States v. Six Barrels of Ground Pepper, White & Gates 817
(S.D.N.Y. 1917) (pepper adulterated by pepper shells); and United States v. 154
Sacks of Oats, supra note 132, the condemned products met the minimum standards
for such foods established by the Government. Cf. United States v. 3998 Cases of Canned
Tomatoes, White & Gates 1213 (D. Del. 1928).
134. See text Part I .sipra.
135. More tampering is permitted in foods which are fabricated from a combination of ingredients and sold under distinctive names because the manufacturer may
be producing and selling a new and desirable food. See United States v. 88 Cases of
Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951) ;
United States v. 70 Gross Bottles of Quenchies, 3 Kleinfeld 141 (S.D. Ohio 1952).
Society has no comparable interest in permitting the sale of a natural food, as such,
which has been reduced to the average prevailing in the market.
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sumer constantly receiving less quality in his foods.' 0 The Government
therefore applies standards based on the natural composition of each
lot of the food, thus making deliberate debasement illegal per se and
giving the greatest possible protection to purchasers and consumers.
3. Statements on the Label:
Some foods set their own standard through representations made
on their labels. For example, a food called "Pinocchio Oil" which is
labeled "25 per cent pure olive oil" or a food which is labeled "Figlia
Mia Brand, a Blend Consisting of 90%o Vegetable Oils, Choice Cottonseed, Corn and Peanut Oils, Plus 10% Pure Olive Oil," may be judged
by these statements in economic adulteration cases." 7 The use of the
label as a standard in economic adulteration cases is well-supported by
precedent at least so far as ingredient statements are concerned." 8
One recent decision has, however, rejected that approach entirely, relying
upon the dictum in Bireley's that a food cannot set its own standard." 9
Another recent decision took precisely the opposite approach. 4
It accepted the label as the standard for the food and looked beyond the
ingredient statement to the "selling copy" for the standard. Both decisions deserve detailed review.
In United States v. Fabro, I4w.," ' the Government brought a criminal action for economic adulteration and the defendant filed a motion
to dismiss. The Government's action was based on section 402 (b) (1)
of the act and the Government charged that defendant's pet food was
adulterated because it was labeled "Guaranteed Analysis Crude Protein
....(Min.) ....11.00%" while the protein content was actually less.
The court dismissed the action stating, "The onl , standard shown by
the information or by the statute upon which it is based is that the
dog food showed upon its label that it contained 11% protein when
136. There is also a possibility that producers permitted to reduce superior natural
foods to average might reduce these foods below average on occasion.
137. See United States v. 40 Cases of Pinocchio Brand Oil, 289 F.2d 343 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 831 (1961) ; United States v. 5 CQses of Figlia Mia Brand,
179 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950).
138. See cases cited in note 137 supra and United States v. Antonio Corrao Corp.,
185 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Barnes v. United States, 142 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1944) ;
United States v. Fabro, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 523 (M.D. Ga. 1962); United States v.
Germack, White & Gates 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1925); United States v. One Carload of
Corno Horse & Mule Feed, 188 Fed. 453 (M.D. Ala. 1911). See also United States
v. Food Products Labs., Inc., 6 Kleinfeld 123 (W.D. Mo. 1963); United States v.
Beck, 2 Kleinfeld 197 (S.D. Iowa 1949).
139. See United States v. Fabro, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 52.3 (M.D. Ga. 1962).
140. See United States v. Food Products Labs., Inc., 6 Xleinfeld 123 (W.D. Mo.

1963).

141.

206 F. Supp. 523 (M.D. Ga. 1962).
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in fact it contained less. Thus, it attempts to make the product serve as
14 2
its own standard, and this the said product cannot be made to do.'

In support of this reasoning, the court cited Bireley's. Bireley's,
however, involved a situation in which the Government attempted to
make the appearance of the product serve as the standard and the
court rightly rejected this approach as "speculative" or even "whimsical."''
The label in Fabro set a definite and specific standard and,
it is submitted, the court in Fabro erred when it failed to follow cases
prior to and after Bireley's which have accepted such a standard in
economic adulteration cases.'
Approximately a year and a half after the Fabro decision, another
district court decided an economic adulteration case based on a label
statement. This case, United States v. Food Products Labs., Inc.,'45
was also a criminal action and the Government brought economic adulteration charges because the defendants shipped in interstate commerce
certain vitamin D enrichment wafers which were labeled as "stable"
and having a "long shelf life" when in fact the wafers were unstable
and had a short shelf life. The court ignored the Bireley's decision
and looked to the label of the food for the standard against which the
food could be judged. The defendants argued that the words "stable"
and "long shelf life" were not used in the absolute sense; that they
were relative words which should not form the basis of a criminal
charge. The court rejected that argument, stating, "We cannot accept
defendants' argument that the offenses here charged could be committed only if words of absolute meaning were used. In cases involving
relative words there are, of course, areas within the center of the
spectrum that may involve difficulty but the tests of particular products
here involved reveal conditions that rise above or fall below any high
or low water marks that could be said to be encompassed within any
doubtful area toward the center of the concept of relativity."' 40 The
defendants were found guilty.
Thus, in contrast to Fabro, which would not accept an absolute
statement on the label as the standard in an economic adulteration case,
the Food Products case held that even relative statements on the label
could be used as the standard. 4 ' The Fabro court cited Bireley's while
142. Id. at 526.

143. United States v. 80 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951).

144. See cases cited notes 137-38 supra.
145.

6 Kleinfeld 123 (W.D. Mo. 1963).

146. Id. at 124.
147. The distinction between absolute and relative statements is perhaps more

often described as tl.e distinction between facts and puffery. Merchants have tradi-
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the Food Products court ignored it. Yet Bireley',- was concerned with
the fatal vagueness of the standard, a problem which was more present in
Food Products than in Fabro.148 It could be argued that the apparent
orange juice content of a beverage is no more vague a standard than
the words "stable" and "long shelf life." '49 If this is so, both cases
were wrong; Fabro because it failed to recognize that label statements
could provide the standard and Food Products because it failed to
recognize that the standard provided by the label must be definite
and precise. Such an interpretation would return the law to its approximate state prior to these cases."'
Part III: The Individual Subsections of Section
A.

402

(b)

Introduction.

After the proper standard has been identified, there must be a
comparison of the allegedly adulterated food with the standard and
a determination whether the differences constitute economic adulteration Not all deviations from the standard are prohibited. For the
Government to prevail, it must prove both a proper standard and a
deviation from that standard which falls within one of the individual
tionally been given wide latitude in expressing their opinions or evaluations of the
intangible qualities of their products although the FTC h,.s decreased that latitude
somewhat in more recent years. See Millstein, The Federl Trade Commission and
False Advertising, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 439, 469-70 (1964). The Food Products decision
suggests that if the puffery on the label relates to the comp sition of the food and is
too extravagant, liability may be imposed under economic adulteration law.
148. Fabro,supra note 139, raised for the first time the question whether Birely's
really barred all standards derived from the food itself from economic adulteration
law, and, contrary to the opinion of the author of this article, answered the question in
the affirmative. Both the question and the answer were unnecessary in Fabro since
the court had other more substantial grounds (which it also relied upon) for finding
for the defendant. See text accompanying notes 161-64 infro.
149. In Bireley's, supra note 143, the court refused to let the jury speculate
whether the apparent orange juice content of the beverage was more than 6%. Presumably the jury had both beverages-Bireley's and natural orange juice-as exhibits.
In Food Products, supra note 140, the court sitting without a jury, decided that vitamin
enrichment wafers labeled "stable" and "long shelf life" were adulterated and misbranded because they could not retain the vitamins "over any significant period of
time." Id. at 125. Both questions seem vague. Assume, howtver, that the court's conclusion that the vitamin enrichment wafers were misbranded was correct, would it
necessarily follow that they were economically adulterated. It could be argued that
when it comes to puffery at least, the courts ought to regard this as the exclusive
province of the misbranding section of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act,
reserving economic adulteration penalties for factual misrepresentations concerning
the composition of the food. There is no indication that the defendant raised this argument in the Food Prodiwts case.
150. Before Fabro, supra note 139, and Food Products, supra note 140, there were
no reported cases in which a court had ever refused to apply 3 definite standard derived
from the food in an economic adulteration case or in which a court had ever applied
puffery as the standard in an economic adulteration case.
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subsections of section 402 (b). The problems encountered under each
subsection are described below.
B. "(b) (1) If Any Valuable Constitutent Has Been In Whole
Or In Part Omitted Or Abstracted Therefrom":
Section 402 (b) (1) provides a food is adulterated if any valuable
constituent is in whole or in part omitted or abstracted therefrom."
The key word in this subsection is "valuable," for it describes those
constituents which cannot be omitted or removed from the food without
adulteration. Every constituent of a food presumably has some value
but Congress apparently intended to distinguish between constituents
of greater and lesser value by the use of the word, "valuable." The
distinction could be based upon the cost of the constituent ("financial
value"); the amount of calories or energy provided by the constituent
("food value"), or the total nutritive contribution made by the constituent ("nutritive value").12 Different results will be reached in
economic adulteration cases, depending upon which value is adopted.
Assume, for example, a quart of milk is labeled "Enriched with
1500 Units of Vitamin A" and the Vitamin A is in part omitted. If
the label sets the standard for the food, it can be argued that, so far
as section 402 (b) (1) is concerned, (a) there is no economic adulteration because "valuable" means "financial value" and Vitamin A
is relatively inexpensive, or, (b) there is no economic adulteration because "valuable" means "food value" and Vitamin A supplies no
calories or energy, or, (c) there is economic adulteration because "valuable" means "nutritive value" and Vitamin A is an important element in
nutrition. Valuable is thus inherently ambiguous in this context and
the statute contains no definition of this highly ambiguous word." 3
The ambiguity implicit in "valuable" has not been clarified by
court decisions. The predecessor 1906 statute prohibited merely the
151. 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 342(b)(1) (1958).
152. These definitions do not appear as such in economic adulteration cases. However, a comparison of FDA's economic adulteration cases and its trade correspondence
illustrates that these values are considered by both FDA and the courts. Compare, for
example, United States v. Two Bags of Poppy Seeds, 147 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1945)
where the holding of economic adulteration was based solely on financial value with
United States v. 36 Drums of Pop'N Oil, 164 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1947) where the
holding of economic adulteration was based primarily on food value, although the
product was also economically inferior. See also FDA Trade Correspondence 311,
August 20, 1940 (1 Kleinfeld 691), and 8A, April 4, 1946 (1 Keinfeld 752) for
examples of FDA's concern about food values. Cf. United States v. Newton Tea &
Spice Co., 275 Fed. 394 (S.D. Ohio 1920), aff'd, 288 Fed. 475 (6th Cir. 1923) a misbranding case in which the court was concerned with the food and nutritive values of
a product labeled as a substitute for eggs.
153. Cf. United States v. Fabro, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 523 (M.D. Ga. 1962).
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abstracting of a valuable constituent."' This seemed to imply a removal of an ingredient from a pre-existing food rather than a failure
to put a usual ingredient into a food 55 and this is probably the reason
why there were so few cases involving adulteration under this subsection of the 1906 Act. The 1906 Act cases relating to this subsection
seemed to involve primarily economic cheapening of foods accompanied
occasionally by a reduction in food or nutritive value as well."5
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 prohibited the
omission as well as the abstraction of valuable constituents and there
has been a slight increase in litigation under the act. In general, however, the courts have avoided any attempt to define or interpret "valuable," although holdings of economic adulteration usually occur in
cases involving pecuniary and nutritive frauds on the public.'
One
of the few cases involving food value was United States v. 70 Gross
5
Bottles of Quenchies."'
In the Quenchies case, the Government seized
a base for soft drinks which had been sweetened by saccarhin instead of
sugar. The Government contended that the beverage base was economically adulterated because saccarhin contributed no calories or
energy and had no food value. One of the Government's witnesses testified that she gave her children soft drinks for energy and that when
154. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, § 7, repeared,52 Stat. 1059 (1938).
155. Cf. United States v. One Carload of Corno Horse and Mule Feed, 188 Fed.
453, 456-57 (M.D. Ala. 1911) : "There is no charge or proof of removal of any part
of the contents of the package as originally put up." But see Lnited States v. Golden &
Co., White & Gates 1033 (Police Ct D.C. 1922) (involviag canned oysters with
excess water in which the court apparently considered it sufficient if the valuable
constituent (oysters) was in part omitted rather than removeL)
156. See United States v. Schider, 246 U.S. 519 (1918); United States v. HallBaker Grain Co., White & Gates 291 (W.D. Mo. 1911), rev'd, because there was
insufficient evidence, 198 Fed. 614 (8th Cir. 1912) (inferior wheat allegedly packed
with No. 2 wheat, reducing its quality); United States v. Rinchini, White & Gates
318 (D. Ariz. 1911) (ice cream allegedly deficient in butterfat); United States v.
One Carload of Corno Horse & Mule Feed, supra note 155 (oat byproducts allegedly
reduced quality of feed when substituted for ground oats) ; United States v. Heimann,
White & Gates 840 (E.D. Ill. 1917) (butterfat allegedly abstracted from milk, reducing its quality) ; and United States v. Golden, supra note 155 (excess water allegedly
put in canned oysters reducing their quality).
157. See United States v. 5 Cases of Figlia Mia Brand, 179 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950) (olive oil omitted from blend of oils) ; Barnes v.
United States, 142 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1944) (vitamin deficicncy in vitamin tablets);
United States v. Fabro, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 523 (M.D. Ga. 1962) (protein omitted
from dog food); United States v. 70 Gross Bottles of Qumchies, 3 Kleinfeld 141
(S.D. Ohio 1952) (sugar allegedly omitted from soft drink base); United States v.
Midfield Packers, 3 Kleinfeld 157 (W.D. Wash. 1952) (fruit in part allegedly omitted
from frozen fruit) ; United States v. Antonio Corrao Corp., 2 Yleinfeld 206 (E.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 185 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1950) (olive oil allegedly omittA!d from blend of oils);
United States v. 55 Cases of Popped Corn, 62 F. Supp. 843 (D. Idaho 1943) (butter
and vegetable oils allegedly omitted from popped corn).
158. 3 Kleinfeld 141 (S.D. Ohio 1952).
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a soft drink was labeled "sweetened," she expected it to contain sugar.0 9
Claimant's position was that many purchasers wanted a beverage base
without sugar. The Court issued a judgment for claimant, noting that
the very absence of calories and food value made the food valuable to
some purchasers. 6
The most recent reported case under section 402 (b) (1) is
In that case, the defendant shipped
United States v. Fabro, Inc.'
a dog and cat food in interstate commerce. The pet food was labeled
with a guaranteed analysis stating the minimum percentages of protein
and fat therein. In fact, the pet food did not contain the minimum
protein and fat stated in the guaranteed analysis and the Government
brought criminal charges against the defendant under section 402
(b) (1). The court dismissed the charges on two grounds: first, because the statute is too vague and indefinite to be sanctioned as a penal
statute and second, because the product cannot serve as its own stand162

ard.

The court's reasoning concerning the vagueness of section 402
(b) (1) was based on the difficulties involved in determining the
meaning of "valuable constituent." The court noted, "The statute
furnishes no definition of what constitutes a 'valuable constituent,'
nor can a satisfactory definition be found in the words themselves. The
word 'valuable' is a relative term susceptible of many interpretations
and of no definite or absolute meaning. '
The latest decision under
section 402 (b) (1) therefore holds that section 402 (b) (1) is too
vague to be enforced in criminal actions and, with this precedent, it is
likely that the Government will have increased difficulties in cases under
this section in the future. 64
159. Id. at 143.
160. Ibid. "Saccharin is allegedly non-nutritious. Unlike sugar it does not
build calories. It merely sweetens. But this very characteristic is a quality that is
much desired and sought by many who fear that their waist line may unduly expand
with the use of sugar."
161. 206 F. Supp. 523 (M.D. Ga. 1962).
162. The court also dismissed the case because under its interpretation of Bireley's
the product could not set its own standard. But see text accompanying notes 141-44
supra for a review of the fallacies of that theory.
163. Supra note 161 at 526.
164. The Government had not been particularly successful in either civil or
criminal cases prior to Fabro, supra note 161. Of the seven cases under § 402(b) (1)
listed in note 157 supra, the Government won two and lost five. The Government is
now in a situation in which its indifferent prior record under § 402(b) (1) is coupled
with a patently recognizable and recognized ambiguity in the statute. Since the Government could not convince the Fabro court that protein was a valuable constituent
of dog food, other courts will probably be hesitant to declare any constituent as "valuable."
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C. "(b) (2) If Any Substance Has Been Substituted Wholly
Or In Part Therefor":
Section 402 (b) (2) is the broadest section of our economic adulteration statute. This section provides that a food is adulterated if
any substance has been substituted wholly or in lart therefor." 5 An
almost identical provision was contained in the 1906 Food and Drugs
Act.

6

'

The statute makes no distinction as to whether the substance substituted is better or worse than the original ingredient. 67 Substitution
of an ingredient is per se sufficient to adulterate a food under the literal
language of the statute. 68 Most improvements in fabricated foods involve a change in the identity or proportion of the ingredients commonly used in these foods. There is thus a substitution of one substance for another which is literally prohibited by section 402 (b) (2).
Because of the sweeping nature of section 402 (b) (2), it has
been relied upon by the Food and Drug Administration in multiplicity
of cases.'
Many of these cases have involved obvious economic frauds
and there can be little quarrel with the results of the cases although
the basic objections to the statute itself remain. The statute was
obviously designed to permit purchasers to purchase recognized foods
with confidence that they will receive the food they desire."' The
165. 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 342 (b)(2) (1958).
166. See Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, § 7, repealed, 52 Stat. 1059
(1938).
167. See CCH FOOD DRUG Cosm. L. REa'.
50,087.
168. Ibid.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Schider, 246 U.S. 519 (1918); Van Liew v. United
States, 321 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Treffinger, 224 F.2d 855 (2d
Cir. 1955); United States v. 716 Cases of Del Comida Bruid Tomatoes, 179 F.2d
174 (10th Cir. 1950) ; United States v. 36 Drums of Pop'N Oil, 164 F.2d 250 (5th Cir.
1947); Libby, McNeill & Libby v. United States, 210 Fed. 143 (4th Cir. 1913); HallBaker Grain Co. v. United States, 198 Fed. 614 (8th Cir. 1912); United States v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 4 Kleinfeld 138 (D. Neb. 1955); Unitel States v. 149 Cases of
Black Eyed Peas, 4 Kleinfeld 27 (D. Colo. 1953); United States v. 70 Gross Bottles
of Quenchies, 3 Kleinfeld 141 (S.D. Ohio 1952) ; United States v. Beck, 2 Kleinfeld
197 (S.D. Iowa 1946) ; United States v. 254 Cases of Baby Br.md Tomato Sauce, 63 F.
Supp. 916 (E.D. Ark. 1945); United States v. 55 Cases of Popped Corn, 62 F. Supp.
843 (D. Idaho 1943).
170. Cf. United States v. Paraskevopolus, White & G~tes 925, 926 (S.D.N.Y.
1919) ; United States v. Shucart, White & Gates 693, 694 (37D. Mo. 1915); United
States v. 58 Sacks of Corn Meal, White & Gates 322, 323 (D. S.C. 1911) (misbranding)
("As a matter of law I charge you that a man when he purchases an article, has a
right to buy whatever he pays his money for; it may be a pure fancy on his part, and
it may be the veriest whim on his part, but if he stipulates in the contract that he is
to buy certain specified articles, or an article prepared in a curtain specified way, and
that is the contract and the agreement, and he pays for it, then he is entitled to have
it, although the result may be that he chooses to buy an inferior article at a higher
price....")
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theory of the statute is analogous to the FTC decisions which hold that
the consumer is prejudiced, if upon giving an order for one thing he is
supplied with something else, even if his choice is dictated by caprice,
fashion or ignorance.' Analogous situations under FTC law are resolved by truthful labeling and it might be argued analogously that
truthful labeling should be accepted as a defense under section 402
(b) (2), even if the labeling is not a defense under the other adulteration sections of the statute.
The applicability of a truthful labeling defense to a economic
adulteration charge under section 402 (b) (2) was presented squarely
in United States v. 7x6 Cases of Del Comida Brand Tomatoes. 2 The
Food and Drug Administration seized the claimant's tomatoes because
water had been added to them. Although economic adulteration charges
might have been alleged under other sections of the statute, the Government relied upon section 402 (b) (2), contending that a product containing water was substituted wholly or in part for the canned tomatoes.
The trial court held that the tomatoes were misbranded but not adulterated and provided in its decree that the tomatoes be released to the
claimant for the purpose of truthful labeling. The Circuit Court reversed, holding that the tomatoes were economically adulterated and
could not be sold in interstate commerce even if they were truthfully
labeled.'
While the facts in the case were certainly unfavorable to
the claimant, the case stands as a precedent for rejecting truthful labeling
as a defense to a section 402 (b) (2) charge, with apparently only
one district court opinion, which is not generally reported, to the contrary.
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171. See, e.g., FTC v.Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
172. 179 F.2d 174 (10th Cir. 1950).
173. Ibid.
174. See United States v.70 Gross Bottles of Quenchies, 3 Kleinfeld 141 (S.D.
Ohio 1952). The court said, "Thus, the generally recognized rule that no illegal substitution occurs where a replacement ismade, inwhole or inpart, with another substance not injurious or deleterious to health, provided the name of the substance substituted appears on the label, governs in these proceedings. And we are not confusing
adulteration with misbranding. United States v. 36 Drums of Pop'N Oil, supra." Id.

at 144.
The Pop'N Oil case, 164 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1947), involved artificially colored
mineral oil which had been prepared as a flavoring for popped corn. The Government
alleged adulteration under § 402(b) (2),(3), and (4) and the Circuit Court only con-

sidered the latter two subsections. No reason is cited by the Circuit Court for not
considering the § 402(b) (2) claim and the District Court opinion is unreported. How-

ever, the Circuit Court states that the District Court dismissed the libel because truthful
labeling was, in the absence of a standard of identity, sufficient to comply with the

act. The court in the Qieenchies case, may have assumed that the failure of the
Circuit Court to reverse the dismissal of the § 402(b) (2) was an implied holding that
labeling was a defense to this section of the statute. Alternatively, the court in Quenchies
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A more recent attempt to limit the all-inclusive language of section
402 (b) (2) was made by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Van
Liew v. United States."" Defendants were convicted of conspiring to sell
and selling an economically adulterated orange drink in interstate commerce. The Government's theory was apparently tiat the orange drink
would be confused with orange juice. The court reversed the conviction
on a number of grounds, one of which was a unique interpretation of section 402 (b) (2).17 The court reasoned that section 402 (b) (2) must
be construed in conjunction with section 402 (b) (1). The substitution
which is prohibited according to the court is the substitution of an ingredient for a valuable constituent of the food.
The validity of this interpretation seems dubious.
Under the
court's interpretation, there would have to be an ommission or abstraction which violated section 402 (b) (1) before there could be a
substitution which violated section 402 (b) (2)17
Section 402
(b) (2) would thus add nothing to section 402 (b) (1) and the
Van Liew case makes sense only if Congress intended to prohibit the
79
same offense twice.

If, as seems likely, the Van Liew case is not the law, the limitations,
if any, on section 402 (b) (2) are not found in the statute itself. A
possible solution is to look to the purpose of the statute. Congress was
clearly trying to prevent fraud and confusion in section 402 (b) (2)
may only have been citing the Pop'NV Oil case for the proposition that adulteration
should not be confused with misbranding.
175. 321 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1963).
176. The court stated, "For there to be a crime under (2), there must be the
substitution of any substance for some valuable constituent of the food. Unless there
is a valuable constituent plus a substitution of any substance for it, there is simply no
crime." Id. at 670.
177. The 1906 Act provided: "That for the purposes of this Act an article shall
be deemed to be adulterated: ....
First...
Second. If any substance has been substituted wholly o- in part for the article.
Third. If any valuable constituent of the article has been wholly or in part
abstracted. .. "

There is thus no possible construction of the 1906 Act whereby it can be logically
concluded that the substance had to be substituted for a "xaluable constituent." The
economic adulteration provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act were
intended to be broader than the corresponding provisions of the 1906 Act. It is therefore inconsistent with the history and purpose of the Federal gFood, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act to conclude that the revised statute was intended to Imit § 402(b) (2) to the
substitution of substances for a valuable constituent. None of the prior cases have so
limited it. See, e.g. cases cited in note 169 supra.
178. Before a substance can be substituted for a valuabl,! constituent, the valuable
constituent must be omitted or abstracted. The omission or abstraction of valuable constituents is prohibited by § 402(b) (1). See 52 Stat. 1046 (193S), 21 U.S.C. § 342(b) (1)

(1958).

179. Ibid.
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and when the substitution results in either economic fraud or a
nutritionally deficient food, the courts will probably find economic
adulterationm.'
The substantiality of the deception and the producer's
intent are probably also relevant.'
Labeling, while not a defense to a
section 402 (b) (2) charge, may be an indication of the producer's
intent since those who intend fraud do not usually publish the changes
they have made in foods. Consideration of these factors would reconcile
most of the cases which have been decided under section 402 (b) (2) 82
Although the same type of interpretation was rejected in the Filled Milk
Act case, it was rejected in very different circumstances."8
Even if
180. See e.g., United States v. 40 Cases of Pinocchio Brand Oil, 289 F.2d 343
(2d Cir), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 831 (1961) (cheaper oils substituted for olive
oil) ; United States v. 716 Cases of Del Comida Brand Tomatoes 179 F.2d 174 (10th Cir.
1950) (water substituted for tomatoes); United States v. 149 Cases of Black Eyed
Peas, 4 Kleinfeld 27 (D. Colo. 1953) (brine substituted for peas); United States v.
Beck, 2 Kleinfeld 197 (S.D. Iowa 1948) (mineral oil and other substances substituted
for butter and cream), all of which were decided in favor of the Government.
181. Compare United States v. 716 Cases of Del Comida Brand Tomatoes, 179
F.2d 174 (10th Cir. 1950) and United States v. 30 Cases of Leader Brand Strawberry
Fruit Spread, 93 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Iowa 1950) with United States v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 4 Kleinfeld 138 (D. Neb. 1955). In the former two cases the violation
was substantial and deliberate while in the latter the alleged adulteration was minor
and inadvertent. Economic adulteration was held in the Del Condda case and the Leader
Brand case but not in the Cudahy case.
182. Compare the cases cited in note 180 supra, with the following cases in which
the claimant (or defendant) prevailed: United States v. Cudahy Packing Co., 4 Kleinfeld 138 (D. Neb. 1955) (minor and inadvertent shortage of fat in oleomargarine);
United States v. 70 Gross Bottles of Quenchies, 3 Kleinfeld 141 (S.D. Ohio 1952)
United States v. 55 Cases of Popped Corn, 62 F. Supp. 843 (D. Idaho 1943).
In general, when the Government has prevailed under § 402(b) (2), it has been
in factual situations where there was economic and nutritional fraud, where the deception was substantial and deliberate, and where there was no labeling indicating the
substitution. Conversely, the claimant (or defendant) has usually prevailed when it
was selling a useful and accurately labeled food with changed ingredients, see Quenchies,
supra, when the substitution was an unintentional error, see Cudahy, vipra, or when
the court saw no reason why the substitution should not be made. See Popped Corn,
supra.
183. The Filled Milk Act, specifically prohibits interstate sale of any milk containing fats or oil other than milk fat or which has been made in imitation or semblance
of milk. 42 Stat. 1486 (1923), 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-63 (1958). The statute is therefore much
more specific than the economic adulteration statute. Additionally, the United States
Supreme Court cases have involved foods which were made in imitation of milk but
which were much less costly. See Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S.
18 (1944) and United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). It is
one thing for the Supreme Court to prohibit the sale of a food consisting of skimmed
milk and coconut oil which is in semblance of milk, or a food which consists of milk
and cottonseed or coconut oil which is in semblance of milk, when there is a specific
statute and the food offers an obvious opportunity for economic fraud. Quite a different
case is presented if, for example, the courts are operating under a general statute such
as § 402(b) (2) and the food involved consists of the ordinary ingredients plus an
added ingredient which is more expensive and improves the nutritive qualities of the
food. There may be a substitution of one substance for another but the courts are
likely to approach the substitution much more sympathetically. Cf. United States v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 4 Kleinfeld 138 (D. Neb. 1955) and United States v. 70 Gross
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this interpretation were adopted, the uncertainty which pervades the
statute would, however, remain. Uncertainty seems highly inappropriate since criminal liability can be imposed for violations committed
without criminal intent under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act."'

D. "(b) (3) If Danage Or Inferiority Ha,'s Been Concealed In
Any Manner":
Of the four subsections of section 403 (b) only subsection 403
(b) (3) is passably well drafted. This subsection provides that a food
is adulterated if damage or inferiority has been concealed in any manner." 5 The corresponding subsection in the 1906 Food and Drugs Act
provided that a food was adulterated if it was mixed, colored, powdered,
coated or stained in a manner whereby damage or inferiority was
concealed. 8 "
The statute therefore requires proof that the food, when compared
to a proper standard, has either been damaged or is inferior and that
the damage or inferiority has been concealed. Damage and inferiority
are two different concepts. Damage means that the .ood has deteriorated
or been injured or suffered a loss of strength or quality. 87 Inferiority
means that the food was originally of low grade or quality. 8 Inferiority
is present if the appearance, texture, composition, digestibility, or
nutritive qualities of the food are of low grade and quality. 88 Foods
may also be economically inferior, depending upon the values of the
market place.'
Concealment of the damage or inferiority is also essential. It is not illegal under this subsection to sell a damaged or
inferior food so long as the damage or inferiority is apparent.
Most of the cases brought by the Government under the 1906
Food and Drugs Act involved foods which had becn artificially colored
to look like superior foods. These cases included cases involving
artificially colored vanillin which simulated varilla extract,' 9' artiBottles of Quenchies, 3 Kleinfeld 141 (S.D. Ohio 1952) for less favorable situations
in which the courts decided in favor of the manufacturer.
184. See Van Liew v. United States, 321 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1963).

185. 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 342(b)(3) (1958).
186. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, § 7, 34 Stat. 768, repe.led, 52 Stat. 1059 (1933).
187. United States v. Ten Cases of Bred Spred, 49 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1931).

188. Ibid.
189. See United States v. 200 Sacks of Wheat Middlir gs, White & Gates 1189
(E.D. Mich. 1926).
190. See United States v. Atlantic Macaroni Co., White & Gates 793, 804
(E.D.N.Y. 1917) ; see also United States v. Two Bags of Poppy Seeds, 147 F.2d 123
(6th Cir. 1945) and United States v. 36 Drums of Pop'N Oil, 164 F.2d 250 (5th Cir.

1947).
191. United States v. Hudson Mfg. Co., White & Gates 462 (N.D. Ill. 1913).
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ficially colored lemon oil and alcohol which simulated lemon flavor,"'
artificially colored derivative of wild cherry bark which simulated cherry
juice,' 98 and artificially colored macaroni which simulated macaroni
composed of superior wheat. 4 One classic series of cases involved flour
which had been bleached white. In the Lexington Mills case"9 which
ultimately went to the Supreme Court, the jury returned a verdict of
adulteration and the Circuit Court reversed the verdict because the
color of the flour was at best an uncertain index of quality and because
the color of the bleached flour was distinct from the color of the
nonbleached superior flour. The United States Supreme Court affirmed
the Circuit Court without deciding the economic adulteration issue since
the case was to be retried to a jury. 9 '
Probably the most well known case arising under this subdivision
of the 1906 Food and Drug Act was United States v. Nesbitt Fruit
Products, Inc. 9 7 The claimant sold a syrup consisting of orange juice,
orange peel flavoring, sugar, and acid in interstate commerce. The Government alleged that the inferiority of this product had been concealed
because it resembled orange juice. The evidence showed that the
color of the syrup itself was far deeper than orange juice and that
the syrup could not possibly be mistaken for orange juice. When an
orange juice drink was prepared, the syrup was diluted by water and
the diluted beverage simulated the color and taste of orange juice.
However, the evidence showed that the dilution was made in the presence of the consumer, and it was obvious to the consumer that the
orange drink was not orange juice. The Circuit Court therefore held
that the inferiority, if any, of the claimant's product had not been
concealed.
The Government occasionally tried concealed inferiority cases under
the 1906 Act involving concealment of inferiority by means other than
artificial coloring. These cases included alleged concealment of inferior
192. United States v. Edward Western Tea & Spice Co., White & Gates 69
(E.D. Mo. 1909).
193. See Weeks v. United States, 224 Fed. 64 (2d Cir. 1915), aff'd on other
grounds, 245 U.S. 618 (1918). The Government was unsuccessful in the Weeks case
because the food was labeled "compound."
194. United States v. Atlantic Macaroni Co., White & Gates 793 (E.D.N.Y.
1917). The macaroni had been colored yellow to simulate the appearance of macaroni
made from semolina flour prepared from durum wheat but was actually prepared from
flour made from inferior wheat.
195. See United States v. 625 Sacks of Flour, White & Gates 129 (W.D. Mo.
1910), rev'd, sub. nor. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co. v. United States, 202 Fed.
615 (8th Cir. 1913), aff'd, 232 U.S. 399 (1914).
196. United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399 (1914).
197. United States v. Nesbitt Fruit Products, Inc., 96 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1938).
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wheat by mixing it with superior wheat ;198 alleged concealment of wild
oats, weed seeds and chaff by mixing them with cultivated oats,19 and
alleged concealment of wheat by-products by powdering them."' However, the Government had very little success in such cases and, in
general, the Government's victories in reported cases under this subsection of the 1906 Act almost universally involved artificially colored
foods.
Although the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 substantially
broadened this subsection, most of the Governments' cases have continued
to involve artificially colored products. The two classic cases under this
section of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act are United States
v. Two Bags of Poppy Seeds"0' and United Stotes v. 36 Drums of
PopN Oil.2 2 In the Poppy Seed case the seeds had been artificially
colored to resemble more expensive seeds. In the Pop'N Oil case, mineral
oil had been artificially colored to resemble butter or vegetable oils. In
both cases the Government alleged that the coloring concealed the inferiority of the foods and in both cases, although the products were
truthfully labeled, the Government was successful. In the Poppy Seed
case it was proved that despite the artificial coloring, the inferiority
would be obvious to the dealers who purchased the poppy seeds although
consumers would be deceived by artificial coloring. In the Pop'N Oil
case, the dealers who purchased the oil recognized that it was not butter
or vegetable oil but consumers of the popped corn would have been
deceived by the use of the oil in place of butter or vegetable oils. In
both cases, the courts held that inferiority was ccncealed if consumers
would be defrauded. In neither the Poppy Seed nor Pop'N Oil case
was the product deceiving anyone at the time of its seizure. Instead,
both courts rested their decision on the ground that the artificially
colored product would deceive consumers in the future.
Despite the fact that most judgments of economic adulteration
under this subsection have involved artificially colored products, the
prohibition is broader than this. The Food and Drug Administration's
Trade Correspondence suggests that if a chemical preservative conceals
the age of a product or if an imitation flavoring conceals the inferior taste
of a product, the foods may be adulterated, although FDA has brought
198. United States v. Hall-Baker Grain Co., White & Gates 291 (W.D. Mo. 1911),
rev'd, 198 Fed. 614 (8th Cir. 1912).
199. United States v. 154 Sacks of Oats, 283 Fed. 985 (W.D. Va. 1922), modified,
294 Fed. 340 (W.D. Va. 1923).
200. United States v. 200 Sacks of Wheat Middlings, White & Gates 1189 (E.D.
Mich. 1926).
201. United States v. Two Bags of Poppy Seeds, 147 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1945).
202. United States v. 36 Drums of Pop'N Oil, 164 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1947).
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no such cases yet." 8

Similarly, inferior foods which are artificially

prepared to have the texture or consistency or even odor of superior
foods may be held to violate this subsection." 4 The outer limits of
subsection 402 (b) (3) are still to be discovered but, in contrast to the
two preceding subsections of the statute, subsection 402 (b) (3) seems
at least to be a relatively straight forward, well-drafted prohibition
against economic and nutritional fraud. 5
E. "(b) (4) If Any Substance Has Been Added Thereto Or
Mixed Or Packed Therewith So As To Increase Its Bulk Or Weight,
Or Reduce Its Quality Or Strength, Or Make It Appear Better Or Of
Greater Value Than It Is":
Section 402 (b) (4) provides that a food is adulterated if any
substance has been added thereto or mixed or packed therewith so as
to increase its bulk or weight, or reduce its quality or strength; or
make it appear greater or of better value than it is.2"" The corresponding
section in the 1906 Act prohibited the mixing or packing of a substance
which reduced the quality and strength of a food but did not prohibit
the addition of substances which increased the bulk or weight of a food,
or made the food appear greater or of better value than it is.20
This
subsection was therefore both lengthened and broadened in the passage
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
Under the 1906 Act, the Government had to prove both that a
substance was mixed or packed with the food and that the added
substance reduced, lowered, or injuriously affected the quality and
strength of the food. The latter element was sometimes supplied by
inference. For example, in the early case of United States v. Griebler20 8
involving watered milk, the court charged the jury, "It is sufficient if
you believe he delivered the milk for shipment, or shipped it, and that
there was water in it, and that the water was mixed therewith so as to
reduce or lower or injuriously affect its quality or strength; and as
to that question you know as much as any witness. It is not a matter
for an expert. It is a matter of everyday knowledge as to whether water
203. FDA TRADE CORRESPONDENCE 49, February 12, 1940 (1 Kleinfeld 589). See
also FDA TRADE CORRESPONDENCE 213, March 21, 1940 (1 Kleinfeld 652).
204. FDA TRADE CORRESPONDENCE 233, April 11, 1940 (1 Kleinfeld 660) ; see also
FDA TRADE CORRESPONDENCE 340, September 17, 1940 (1 Kleinfeld 703).
205. If, for example, diluted jam is made to appear to have the consistency of
ordinary jam, it would seem to violate § 402(b) (4). Cf. United States v. 30 Cases of
Leader Brand Strawberry Fruit Spread, 93 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Iowa 1950); FDA
TRADE CORRESPONDENCE 185, March 15, 1940 (1 Kleinfeld 641).
206. 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 342(b) (4).

207. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, § 7, 34 Stat. 768, repealed, 52 Stat. 1059 (1938).
208. White & Gates 29 (E.D. Ill. 1908).
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in the milk would reduce or lower its strength. Everybody knows that
it does. So if you believe from the evidence that there was water in
the milk you will convict the defendant."2 9 Similiarly in cases in which
alcohol was added to lemon oil,21 pepper shells were added to pepper,"'
and cottonseed oil was added to olive oil,212 the courts did not seem to
require direct evidence indicating that the quality and strength of the
food was reduced.
Other cases under the 1906 Act were more complex and evidence
was apparently required to prove that the quality and strength of the
food was reduced. For example, when nitrates were added to flour,
the Government proved that the flour did not improve with age as
ordinary flour would have. 18 Since the effect of nitrates upon flour
was not common knowledge, such evidence was probably necessary to
prove a violation of the statute.
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act three separate offenses are prohibited by section 402 (b) (4). These offenses are
mixing or packing a substance with the food, wh~ch (i) increases its
bulk or weight; (ii) reduces its quality or strength; or (iii) makes it
appear better or of greater value than it is.214 The last prohibition is
the broadest of the subsections and, as one would anticipate, the Food
and Drug Administration has concentrated almost exclusively in its
enforcement upon it.
FDA's early victories under section 402 (b) (4) involved poppy
seeds which had been artificially colored to stimulate more expensive
poppy seeds21" and mineral oil which had been artificially colored to
simulate butter or vegetable oils. 1 Since the artificially colored foods
appeared to retail purchasers and consumers to be more expensive foods,
the courts concluded that they were made to appear better or of greater
value than they were.
In the leading Bireley's case 17 the Government alleged that claim209. Id. at 30.
210. See United States v. Edward Westen Tea & Spice Co., White & Gates 69
(E.D. Mo. 1909).
211. See United States v. Six Barrels of Ground Pepier, White & Gates 817
(S.D.N.Y. 1917).
212. See United States v. Alban, White & Gates 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); United
States v. Monahos, White & Gates 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
213. United States v. 625 Sacks of Flour, White & Gates 129 (W.D. Mo. 1910),
rcv'd on other grounds, sub. inom. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co. v. United States, 202
Fed. 615 (8th Cir. 1913), aff'd, 232 U.S. 399 (1914).
214. See Van Liew v. United States, 321 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1963).
215. United States v. Two Bags of Poppy Seeds, 147 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1945).
216. United States v. 36 Drums of Pop'N Oil, 164 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1947).
217. United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951).
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ant's orange beverage appeared to be better than it was because it appeared to be composed entirely or in large part of orange juice while
it only contained 6% orange juice. The trial court had charged the
jury that the product was adulterated if any part of the public including
the ignorant, the unthinking, the credulous and those who do not stop
to analyze in making a purchase would be misled.21 The Circuit Court
reversed, holding, "The correct standard was the reaction of the ordinary
consumer, under such circumstances as attended retail distribution of
this product. When a statute leaves such a matter as this without
specification the normal inference is that the legislature contemplated
the reaction of the ordinary person who is neither savant nor dolt, who
lacks special competency with reference to the matter at hand but has
and exercises a normal measure of the layman's common sense and
'9
21
judgment.

Despite the holding of the Bireley's case, the questions to whom
the food must appear better than it is, and how it is to be determined
whether the food appears better than it is, seem far from settled. In
Bireley's, the Government tried for a broad FTC-type standard and
was defeated.22 In future cases, the attempts to lower the intelligence
level will probably be more subtle. The Bireley's case does not bar the
Government from proving by market research that particular foods appeal to children and the less educated and less sophisticated portion of
the population and this type of evidence will probably present a much
closer question. This evidence would certainly fall within the Bireley's
rule that "all circumstances of retail acquisition and consumption are
relevant." 22' The closest authority in point, however, seems to be a mis218. Ibid.
219. Id. at 971.
220. FDA's extreme position in Bireley's was apparently derived from Aronberg
v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942). See Developments in the Law - The Federal
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 67 HARv. L. Rxv. 632, 648 at n. 118 (1954).
The charge of the trial court is also very similar to the standard applied in Charles
of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944). Cf. Millstein,
The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 439, 457-62
(1964) for a review of the standard usually applied in FTC advertising cases. Under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the courts have usually applied an ordinary
purchaser standard. See Nelson, What Standard For The "NonstandardizedFood. The
Bireley's Case, 8 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 425, 433 (1953) ; see also Forte, The Food and
Drug Administration, The Federal Trade Commission and the Deceptilve Packaging of
Foods, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 860, 869 (1965). This may be because the ordinary purchaser
standard is implied under § 403(f) of the act. 52 Stat. 1047 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 343(f)
(1958). Cf. United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951) relying upon § 403(f) as authority for
the ordinary purchaser standard.
221. United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, supra note 217.
See Forte, The Food and Drug Administration, The Federal Trade Commissio and
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leading packaging case and the court there rejected the Government's
argument that "the question is whether the package is so filled as to
mislead an average five-year-old child who might expect the box to be
filled to overflowing," accepting instead an ordinary person standard.22
One of the interesting questions raised by Bireley's is whether
proof that restaurant patrons will be deceived by the food is sufficient
to cause the food to be considered as economically adulterated. If so,
the packaging and labeling of the food would be irrelevant since they
would not ordinarily be seen by restaurant customers. The Bireley's
court held that the packaging and labeling were relevant in the absence
of proof that some considerable part of the retail trade acquired the
food without the packaging. 222 The court cited in support of the holding
the Circuit Court's opinion in United States v. 62 Cases of Tam224 in
which the Circuit Court held that imitation jam violated section 403 (g)
because it was served to restaurant customers as the standardized food
jam without disclosure that it was an imitation. The Circuit Court's
opinion in the Jam case was later reversed by the United States Supreme
Court which held that the prominent disclosure of the word "imitation"
on the label was sufficient to warrant a judgment for the claimant.22 The
United States Supreme Court has thus indirectly strengthened the agreement for consideration of packaging and labeling in section 402
(b) (4) cases. The realities of the marketplace also strengthen the
argument. If the possibility of a restaurant passing-off an imitation for
a superior food were all that were required for economic adulteration,
many common and useful foods such as oleomargarine, vegetable whipping bases, and powdered milk, and all imitation arid substandard foods
could be considered economically adulterated. It seems likely therefore
that the courts will continue to regard packaging and labeling as one consideration in determining whether foods appear better than they are exthe Deceptive Packaging of Foods, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 860, 870 (1965) for the author's
views on the limitations of market research in defining the o 'dinary purchaser.
222. United States v. 116 Boxes of Arden's Assorted Candy Drops, 80 F. Supp.
911 (D. Mass. 1948). Apparently the FDA believes the same type of rule will apply in
economic adulteration cases. See testimony of George Larrick, then Commissioner of
the Food and Drug Administration, before a Special Subcomnnttee of the Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare of United States Senate on S. 1839 and H.R. 7042, 89th

Cong. 1st Sess., p. 10 (1965).
223. See United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, supra note 217;
United States v. 306 Cases of Sandford Tomato Catsup with Preservative, 55 F Supp.
725 (E.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd, sub nora. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. United States, 148 F.2d
71 (2d Cir. 1945) (in which the court noted in passing the problems raised by restaurant
consumption of a food which simulated a standardized food).
224. 183 F.2d 1014 (10th Cir. 1950), rev'd, 340 U.S. 593 (1951).
225. 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593 (1951).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
cept when the evidence indicates either that there is a considerable amount
of palming-off of the food in restaurants or the food is actually
designed for palming off in restaurants and other situations."'
Probably the most difficult question concerning to whom the food
must appear "better than it is" was presented in United States v. Antonio
Corrao Corp.2 ' In the Corrao case the defendants sold in interstate
commerce a blend of oils marked 80%o peanut oil and 20% olive oil.
The Government seized the blend of oils as economically adulterated,
alleging that it contained little olive oil and had been made to appear
better than it was by the addition of artificial flavoring which simulated
the flavor of olive oil and squalene which simulated the chemical properties of olive oil. The interesting legal question arose because of
the presence of the squalene.
Squalene is an odorless colorless substance which cannot be detected
by the consumer. However, squalene is a natural component of olive
oil and the Government therefore tests for squalene content when it
attempts to determine whether olive oil has been omitted or removed
from a food. To frustrate the Government's tests, the defendants added
squalene artificially to the blend of oils. The district court concluded that the blend of oils actually contained the 20% olive oil stated
on the label but that the blend of oils was adulterated under section
402 (b) (4) because the added squalene made the blend appear better
than it was to the Government officials who tested it-i.e., the blend
appeared to contain more than 20% olive oil to the Government's officers.228
On appeal, the Circuit Court reversed, holding that since the natural
squalene content of olive oil varies and there was no indication of the
amount of squalene added, it could not be said that the added squalene
was sufficient to deceive the Government's officers. The Circuit Court
therefore never reached the question of whether a food is economically
adulterated if it is made to appear "better than it is" to the Government, but not to ordinary purchasers and consumers. 29
226. Cf. note 76 supra. The artifically colored mineral oil in the Pop'N Oil case
and the artificially colored poppy seeds in the Poppy Seed case were foods which were
actually designed for "palming-off" and the courts therefore disregarded the labeling
of these foods. See United States v. 36 Drums of Pop'N Oil, 164 F.2d 250 (5th Cir.
1947) and United States v. Two Bags of Poppy Seeds, 147 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1945).
227. 185 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1950).
228. The district court's opinion is reported at 2 Kleinfeld 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
229. The Circuit Court said, "It is suggested, however, that indirect deception, in
violation of the statute, occurred if the added squalene, on an ordinary squalene test,
led the officers to believe that the blend contained a larger percentage of olive oil
than it did contain, even if the actual percentage was 20%, i.e., the percentage represented to the consumer. It may be urged that such a construction of the statute is
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This type of case can be approached as an agency situation. It
could be reasoned that the ordinary purchasers and consumers have,
through their legislators, appointed Government officials as their agents
to make certain that the foods sold to them comply with the law. The
fraud, if any, in the Corrao situation was on the governmental agents
rather than on the ordinary purchaser-principal. Since the purchaserprincipal received exactly what was specified, the fraud would seem
immaterial, and since the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was
intended to protect purchaser-principals rather than governmental agents,
there would be no adulteration.
Because section 402 (b) (4) was changed so significantly from
its predecessor section of the 1906 Act, there are probably even more
unresolved questions concerning this subsection than exist concerning the
other subsections of the act. The Bireley's and Corrao cases illustrate
the interesting and complex questions which can arise concerning to
whom the food must appear better than it is. Other questions will
probably arise concerning how the food can appear better than it is.
Bireley's says flavor can be considered, so "appear-" does not seem to
be limited to visual impressions of the food.23 The Food and Drug
Administration's Trade Correspondence suggests if water is added to
poultry,23' if silver nitrate is added to fish,2"' if artificial coloring is
added to baked goods,233 and if artificial flavor is added to food,2" 4
these foods may appear better than they are. The Government therefore views this portion of the statute as applying to many varied
situations.
There has been very little reported litigation in connection with
that portion of subsection (b) (4) which prohibits packing a substance
with food to increase its bulk or weight. In United States v. 30 Cases
of Leader Brand Strawberry Fruit Spread,23 the court held that adding
water, sugar and corn syrup to a purported jam violated this section
of the statute and in other cases the Government has contended that
untenable because, unless there is less olive oil than that stat,!d on the label, the consumer, who knows nothing of the squalene content, cannot be disadvantaged economically
since he receives what he thinks he is buying. But we need not decide whether the
suggested construction of the statute is correct...." United States v. Antonio Corrao

Corp., 185 F.2d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1950).
230. See United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967,
971 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951).
231. FDA TRADE CORRESPONDENCE 154, March 7, 1940 (1 Kleinfeld 629).
232.
233.
234.

FDA TRADE CORRESPONDENCE 213, March 21, 1940 (1 Kleinfeld 652).
FDA TRADE CORRESPONDENCE 218, March 21, 1940 (1 Kleinfeld 654).
FDA TRADE CORRESPONDENCE 233, April 11, 1940 (1 Kleinfeld 660).

235. 93 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
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adding excess water to canned oysters. 6 and adding water and sugar
to orange juice is a violation,"t but the first case was lost on the facts
and the second through faulty pleading. FDA's Trade Correspondence
also suggests that soaking poultry in water is a violation of this portion of the statute."'8 Most violations of this prohibition and the
prohibition against adding substances which reduce the quality and
strength of a food are also violations of that portion of the subsection
which prohibits packing a substance with the food which makes it
appear better or of greater value than it is, and this probably explains
the scarcity of reported cases under the first two portions of subsection 402 (b) (4).
Part IV: Conclusion
Congress in the 1906 Food and Drugs Act enacted our first
comprehensive legislation prohibiting the economic adulteration of foods.
The Government secured judgments in both criminal and civil cases
under the 1906 Act and, in general, the act was sufficient to eliminate
blatant economic cheats. 3 ' However, the more subtle economic cheats
remained, 4 and the Government under the 1906 Act was unable to
prevent the sale of economically debased foods which were sold as
compounds or blends or labeled with distinctive names.
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was designed to
eliminate the loopholes in the 1906 Act. Although the Federal Food,
Drugs, and Cosmetic Act was actually enacted in 1938, the roots of the
statute lie in the early 1930's.241 As in another noted depression era stat236. See United States v. W.F. Morgan, 155 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Va. 1957).
237. Van Liew v. United States, 321 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1963).
238. FDA TRADE CORRESPONDENCE 154, March 7, 1940 (1 Kleinfeld 629).
239. The passage of the 1906 Food and Drugs Act had an almost immediate
effect upon economic adulteration. As early as 1917 the Bureau of Chemistry noted
in its report to the Department of Agriculture: "The best evidence that many of the
abuses formerly occurring in the food industry have ceased, is to be found in the fact
that the violations of the Food and Drugs Act observed today are hardly comparable
with those obtained during the first few years of the past decade. Most of the staple
food products now found in violation are either of a higher grade than formerly, or
are products of the clever adulterator, that is of those who have more or less anticipated
the ordinary means of detection by so manipulating their products so that not infrequently
the adulteration can be detected only by the most detailed and painstaking chemical
analysis coupled with factory inspection." 1917 Report of the Bureau of Chemistry 14,
DUNBAR, FEDERAL FOOD DRUG & CoSamErIc LAw-ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTS 1907-1949,
368 (1951). In 1926, the Bureau reported, "The enactment and the enforcement of the
Federal and State food legislation has restored the confidence of the public in the purity
and wholesomeness of the food supply of the Nation." Id. at 635.
240. See 1931 Report of the Food and Drug Administration 5, DUNBAR, FEDERAL
FOOD DRUG & CosmmrIc LAW - ADMINISTRATIvE REPORTs 1907-1949, 743 (1951) and
note 239 supra.
241. The proposed revision of the 1906 Food and Drugs Act was introduced on
June 12, 1933, and enacted on June 25, 1938. See DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD DRUG AND
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ute, the Robinson-Patman Act,242 drastic action rather than precision of
language was the foremost consideration of proponents of the law. 2 3
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act's economic adulteration
provisions suffer from two significant defects. First is the failure to
describe precisely the standards against which the allegedly adulterated
food is to be judged.244 Second is the failure to describe precisely the
types of deficiencies from the standard which constitute economic adulteration."4
The combination of these two deficiencies have confounded the courts which have issued diverse and conflicting opinions.24
While the trend seems to be to refuse to apply economic adulteration
sanctions at all, except in the clearest of cases,24 in at least one recent
case economic adulteration sanctions were applied under very dubious
CosmETic Act 29-30, 1015 (1938).

Although the public was apparently complacent in
1926, by 1930 there was evidence of renewed public interest in the measures taken by
the Government to insure wholesome, pure, and honest food. See Annual Reports of
Food and Drug Administration for 1926, at 19, and 1930, at 2 reprinted at DUNBAR,
.supra note 239 at 635 and 714. Consumers' groups thought the new law was not tough
enough and urged Roosevelt to veto it. See Young, The Government and the Consumer:
Evolution of Food and Drug Laws The 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 13
J. PUB. LAW 197, 203 (1964).
242. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
243. Both the FDA and the muckrakers sought a revision of the 1906 Food and
Drugs Act. The muckrakers were represented in large part by an organization called
Consumers Research and this organization's suggestions were considered even by
FDA as "too extreme to be practicable." Young, supra note 241 at 200.
244. These standards appear to be (1) a familiar recc:gnizable food, (2) the
natural composition of a natural food, (3) label statement, and (4) possibly the
standards set by secondary meaning of a food. See Text Part II supra and note 84
slupra. However, these standards are not set forth in the statute or any regulations and,
if the author's interpretation of "food" in § 402(b) and the Bireley's case, is correct,
other standards could also be used provided they were reasonably definite and precise.
See Part II supra.
245. See Text Part III supra. This is the most vital dcfect in the current law
law.
246. Compare United States v. Fabro, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 523 (M.D. Ga. 1962)
(holding that the label cannot set the standard in an economic adulteration case) with
United States v. Food Products Labs., Inc., 6 Kleinfeld 123 (11.D. Mo. 1963) (holding
the contrary). Or compare United States v. 716 Cases of Del Comida Brand Tomatoes,
179 F.2d 174 (10th Cir. 1950) (holding proper labeling is not - defense to an economic
adulteration charge under § 402(b) (2)) with United States v. 70 Gross Bottles of
Quenchies, 3 Kleinfeld 141, 144 (S.D. Ohio 1952) (which cites the "generally recognized
rule that labeling is such a defense.") Or, compare United St tes v. 716 Cases of Del
Comida Brand Tomatoes, supra, and United States v. 30 Cases of Leader Brand Strawberry Fruit Spread, 93 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Iowa 1950) (which 3eem to accept standards
of quality and identity as conclusive proof of the standard in economic adulteration
cases) with United States v. Cudahy Packing Co., 4 Kleinfeld 138 (D. Neb. 1955)
(holding that such standards are totally irrelevant).
247. See Van Liew v. United States, 321 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1963) ; United States
v. Fabro, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 523 (M.D. Ga. 1962); United States v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 4 Kleinfeld 138 (D. Neb. 1955); United States v. Midfield Packers, 3 Kleinfeld
157 (W.D. Wash. 1952); United States v. 70 Gross Bottles oi Quenchies, 3 Kleinfeld
141 (S.D. Ohio 1952) ; cf. United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187
F.2d 967 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951).
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circumstances.248 Economic adulteration law therefore resembles a
type of national lottery in which the odds are that the defendant will
go free although he may not if he happens to draw the wrong judge.
When criminal liability can be imposed without intent, it would
seem that the legislature, the governmental agency which administers
the law, and the courts have a responsibility to issue precise and
definite guidelines which will permit persons to predict in advance the
consequences of their conduct. Yet all of these have abdicated this
responsibility in relation to our economic adulteration laws and chaos
has resulted. There is a patent and immediate need for a revised
economic adulteration statute. In the interim, the Food and Drug
Administration should by interpretative regulations define and explain
what constitutes a violation of the present act.249
248. See United States v. Food Products Labs., Inc., 6 Kleinfeld 123 (W.D. Mo.
1963) wherein relative (or puffery) statements furnished the standard against which
the food was judged.
249. In another context, Judge Friendly has advanced the thesis that the
success of the administrative process is dependent upon the development of more
definite standards. See Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need

For Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1962). Judge Friendly

suggests that precise standards are necessary to require like treatment under like cir-

cumstances; to permit security of 'business transactions; to make the standards for
administrative action known and therefore amenable to change; to maintain the independence of administrative agencies from improper lobbying and political influences;
and to inform and educate the staff of the administrative agency. Id. at 878-82. Therefore, even if the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act only provided for civil penalties,
the vagueness of the present statute, unclarified by interpretative regulations, would
still be highly undesirable.

